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Abstract
We initiate the study of computable model theory of modal logic, by proving e#ective com-
pleteness theorems for a variety of 4rst-order modal logics. We formulate a natural de4nition
of a decidable Kripke model, and show how to construct such a decidable Kripke model of
a given decidable theory. Our construction is inspired by the e#ective Henkin construction for
classical logic. The Henkin construction, however, depends in an essential way on the Deduction
Theorem. In its usual form the Deduction Theorem fails for modal logic. In our construction,
the Deduction Theorem is replaced by a result about objects called 4nite Kripke diagrams. We
argue that this result can be viewed as an analogue of the Deduction Theorem for modal logic.
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1. Introduction
The formalization of computability and the subsequent development of computability
(or recursion) theory in the middle part of the last century made it possible to inves-
tigate the e#ective content of various mathematical structures and constructions. This
area of study has Aourished since its inception in the 1960s and 1970s, culminating in
the recent publication of the Handbook of Recursive Mathematics [2]. We refer the
reader to the Introduction of that text for a comprehensive history and overview of the
subject.
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One of the primary areas of Recursive Mathematics is computable model theory.
Here we refer to the subject as classical computable model theory, since it has fo-
cused on the model theory of classical (4rst-order) logic. The 4rst result of classical
computable model theory is the e#ective completeness theorem: every decidable theory
has a decidable model. The proof of this theorem consists of an e#ective version of
Henkin’s construction. We present this proof in detail in Section 2.1. As we shall see,
Henkin’s construction depends in an essential way on the Deduction Theorem.
More recently, research has begun into the computable model theory of non-classical
logics. Ishihara, Khoussainov, and Nerode have proved an e#ective completeness the-
orem for intuitionistic logic [9]. Their construction of a decidable intuitionistic Kripke
model adapted the e#ective Henkin construction for classical 4rst-order logic to the
context of intuitionistic Kripke models. To do so, they took advantage of the fact that
the Deduction Theorem holds for intutionistic logic.
This work continues the development of the computable model theory of non-
classical logics by initiating the study of the computable model theory of modal logics.
In Section 3, we prove an e#ective completeness theorem for a particular modal logic:
4rst-order constant domain K. In Sections 5 and 6 we generalize this result to numerous
other 4rst-order modal logics: K, T, K5, S4, and S5, with any of three comain domain
assumptions (constant domains, monotonically increasing domains, varying domains).
Our constructions of decidable Kripke models for these modal logics draw on the
ideas behind Henkin’s construction. But, of course, the Deduction Theorem (in its
usual form) fails for modal logic. We develop a technique for e#ectively constructing
Kripke models which is analogous to Henkin’s method, using structures which we call
4nite Kripke diagrams. The use of the Deduction Theorem in the classical Henkin
construction is replaced by a result about 4nite Kripke diagrams, which we call the
Testing Lemma. We argue in Section 4 that this Testing Lemma can be viewed as an
analogue of the Deduction Theorem for modal logic.
We begin in the following section with some preliminaries: a recap of the e#ective
Henkin construction for classical 4rst-order logic, and the necessary de4nitions for
modal logic.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Henkin’s construction
The e#ective completeness theorem for classical 4rst-order logic is proved by simply
noticing that the standard Henkin construction can be carried out e#ectively for a
decidable theory T . As we mentioned, it is the starting point of the subject of classical
computable model theory; indeed, it is the 4rst theorem in the 4rst chapter of the
Handbook of Recursive Mathematics [7, pp. 18–19]. We repeat the proof here, so
that we can compare and contrast it with the our e#ective construction for modal
logic.
Let A be a model for a classical 4rst-order language L, with domain A. Then LA is
the expansion of L obtained by adding a new constant symbol ca for each a∈A. We
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may assume that A is a model for the language LA, in which each such ca names a.
Recall that the complete diagram of A is the set of all sentences of LA which are true
in A.
Also recall that a model A is decidable if its complete diagram is computable. A
decidable theory is a computable set of sentences closed under logical consequence.
We will assume throughout that every theory is consistent.
Construction 2.1. Given a decidable theory T , the construction will produce a model
A. Fix a computable enumeration c0; c1; c2; : : : of an in4nite set of new constants C
(i.e., L∩C = ∅), and 4x a computable enumeration 	0; 	1; 	2; : : : of all sentences in
the extended language L∪C.
We will e#ectively build a complete diagram 
 of a model of T in stages, by sat-
isfying each eth completeness requirement at some 4nite stage: at each stage, we will
add either 	e or ¬	e to 
. At each 4nite stage we will have a 4nite approximation
(denoted by { 0;  1; : : : ;  n−1} below) to 
. The Deduction Theorem is used to e#ec-
tively decide—based on the decidability of T—whether to add 	e or ¬	e at a given
stage. The model de4ned by 
 is decidable since 
 is built as a computable set.
More precisely, de4ne a sequence of formulas  0;  1;  2; : : : as follows:
• Stage 0:  0 =	
• Stage n=2e+1 (satisfy the eth completeness requirement): Let n =  0 ∧  1 ∧ · · · ∧
 n−1. E#ectively check whether
T |= n → ¬	e:
If so, let  n =¬	e. Otherwise (T |= n→¬	n), let  n =	e.
• Stage n=2e + 2 (satisfy Henkin witness requirement): If  n−1 =∃ x(x), let  n =
(ci), where ci is the least element of C which does not occur in n−1.
Now we de4ne a model A from 
. The domain of A is C (assume for now that
L does not include equality). The interpretation RA of each atomic relation symbol R
is determined by the contents of 
. For each n-place relation symbol R and n-tuple Nc
from C,
Nc ∈ RA ⇔ R( Nc) ∈ 
:
The de4nition of RA serves as the base case of the induction in the proof of the
following result.
Lemma 2.2 (Truth Lemma). For every sentence 	 of L∪C,
A |= 	 ⇔ 	 ∈ 
:
By the construction, 
 is computable and contains T . Thus, the Truth Lemma es-
tablishes that A is a decidable model of T , completing the proof of the e#ective
completeness theorem for classical 4rst-order logic:
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Theorem 2.3. A decidable theory T in a classical ;rst-order language L has a decid-
able model.
Note that the Deduction Theorem is essential to this construction. It is used in the
key step, to e#ectively decide how to satisfy the eth completeness requirement: we add
¬	e at stage n=2e + 1 i# T |= n→¬	e. This is because are committed to adding
¬	e to 
 at stage n=2e + 1 if the 4nite approximation to 
 constructed so far (n)
semantically entails ¬	e over T , i.e., if every model of T ∪{n} is also a model of
¬	e. This is the LHS of the Deduction Theorem:
T ∪ {n} |= ¬	e ⇔ T |= n → ¬	e:
The Deduction Theorem allows us to e#ectively decide whether the LHS holds is
true, because we can using the decidability of T to e#ectively check whether the RHS
is true. Thus, the Deduction Theorem provides a syntactic characterization (whether
T |= n→¬	e) of the relevant semantic condition (whether every model of T ∪{n}
is also a model of ¬	e).
Also note that we ful4ll the Henkin witness requirements so that the Truth Lemma
is satis4ed. If we put an existential sentence ∃ x(x)∈
, then we need to make sure
A |=∃ x(x). To that end we also put (ci)∈
, for some ci ∈C.
Both these aspects of the Henkin construction, the essential use of the Deduc-
tion Theorem and the Henkin witnesses, will be important as we turn our attention
to modal logics and Kripke models. One, we will need to work around the Deduc-
tion Theorem, since it fails for modal logic. And two, we will use the idea behind
the Henkin witness requirement to deal with the modalities (speci4cally ) of modal
logic.
2.2. First-order modal logic
We will prove an e#ective completeness theorem for 4rst-order constant domain
modal logic, with the basic  and modalities. First we de4ne the syntax and semantics
of the logic, and introduce computability into the semantics.
2.2.1. Syntax
We de4ne a 4rst-order modal language L over a given set of relation symbols,
constant symbols, and variables. The terms of L are the constant symbols and variables.
The atomic formulas of L are all expressions of the form P(t1; : : : ; tn), where P is an
n-place relation symbol and the ti are terms. The set of formulas of L is de4ned as
follows:
• each atomic formula is a formula;
• if 	 is a formula, then so is ¬	;
• if 	;  are formulas, then so is 	 ∧  ;
• if 	 is a formula and x is a variable, then so is ∃ x	;
• if 	 is formula, then so are 	, 	.
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2.2.2. Semantics
Denition 2.4. A (constant domain) Kripke model M =(W;R;D; I) for a language L
consists of
• a non-empty set of possible worlds W ;
• a binary possibility relation R⊆W×W ;
• a non-empty domain D;
• an interpretation I such that
◦ I(w)(P)⊆Dn for every n-place relation symbol P of L;
◦ I(c)∈D for every constant symbol c of L.
We may view a Kripke model as a collection of classical models, one for each possible
world w∈W , tied together by the possibility relation R. In this section we restrict our
attention to constant domain Kripke models, in which the classical models have the
same domain D. 1
As with predicate logic, we can expand a Kripke model M by adding new constants
for each of the elements in the domain. Given a modal language L and a Kripke model
M for L, we extend L to a language LM by adding a constant symbol ca for each a∈D.
Then M is expanded to a model for LM by setting I(ca)= a for each a∈D.
We de4ne the conditions under which a sentence 	 is true at a world w in a model
M (notation: (M;w) |=	) by induction on the structure of 	:
• (M;w) |=P(c0; : : : ; cn) i# (I(c0); : : : ; I(cn))∈ I(w)(P);
• (M;w) |=¬	 i# (M;w) |=	;
• (M;w) |=	 ∧  i# (M;w) |=	 and (M;w) |=  ;
• (M;w) |=∃ x	(x) i# (M;w) |=	(ca) for some a∈D;
• (M;w) |=  	 i# (M;w′) |=	 for some w′ such that (w; w′)∈R;
• (M;w) |= 	 i# (M;w′) |=	 for every w′ such that (w; w′)∈R.
We have de4ned what it means for a sentence to be true at a world w in a model M .
A sentence 	 is true in a model M (notation: M |=	) i# (M;w) |=	 for every w∈W .
For a set of sentences T , M is a model of T (notation: M |=T ) i# M |=	 for every
	∈T .
Finally, we have a notion of logical consequence, which will be essential as we turn
our attention to theories. A sentence 	 is a logical consequence of a set of sentences
T (notation: T |=	) i# for every model M such that M |=T , it is also the case that
M |=	.
Lemma 2.5. T |=	 i= there exists a model M =(W; : : :) and a world w∈W such that
M |=T but (M;w) |=¬	.
1 Note that we have made no restriction on the possibility relation R; it can be any binary relation
whatsoever. Thus, the logic we have de4ned is constant domain K. In Sections 5 and 6 we will investigate
two standard generalizations of constant domain models (varying domain models and monotonic domain
Kripke models), and also look at the logics de4ned by placing restrictions on the possibility relations
(T;K4;S4, etc.).
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This follows from the preceding de4nitions.
Finally, as in predicate logic, a theory in a modal language L is a set of sentences
of L closed under logical consequence.
2.3. Decidable Kripke models
Now we introduce computability into the semantics of modal logic, by generalizing
the notion of a decidable model to Kripke models.
Denition 2.6. A Kripke model M =(W;R;D; I) for the language L is decidable if the
sets W;D and the relation R are each computable, and truth at a world is decidable,
i.e., the relation
{(w; 	) : (M;w) |= 	}
is computable, where 	 ranges over the sentences of LM .
A classical 4rst-order model is decidable if the truth of each sentence in the model
is computable. In a Kripke model, truth of a sentence is relative to a given world in the
model. So for a Kripke model to be decidable, the truth of a given sentence in a given
world must be computable. We also require the possibility relation to be computable.
A decidable theory is a computable set of sentences of a modal language L which
is closed under logical consequence, i.e., a theory T is decidable i# T = {	 :T |=	}
is a computable set.
Our goal is to prove an e#ective completeness theorem for modal logic, by con-
structing a decidable Kripke model of a given decidable theory.
2.4. The canonical model
Our construction of a decidable Kripke model will combine aspects of two well-
known constructions: the (e#ective) Henkin construction for 4rst-order classical 4rst-
order logic, as presented in Construction 2.1; and the canonical model construction for
modal logics, which we sketch in this section.
The canonical model construction is often used to prove completeness theorems for
various modal logics. 2 There are complications in carrying out the canonical model
construction for 4rst-order modal logics (for a detailed discussion, see [6]), but for
propositional modal logic the construction is relatively straightforward. So we present
the canonical model construction in the context of propositional modal logic, though
we use it as an inspiration for our construction in the context of 4rst-order modal logic.
Instead of taking a detour into the details of propositional modal logic, let us just
say that propositional modal logic is de4ned much as 4rst-order modal logic was in
Section 2.2, but with a set of atomic propositions in place of the atomic relation
symbols and atomic formulas. Then a propositional Kripke model takes the form
2 See, for example, [1,3,4,8] for detailed presentations of the canonical model construction for various
modal logics.
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M =(W;R; I), where W and R are as before, but now I(w)(P)∈{T; F} for each atomic
proposition P.
Given a theory T in a propositional modal language, the canonical model for T is
de4ned as follows:
• the set of possible worlds W is the set of all maximal consistent sets of formulas
which contain T ;
• the possibility relation R is de4ned by the following syntactic relation between the
maximal consistent sets:
(v; w) ∈ R ⇔ {	 : 	 ∈ v} ⊆ w:
• the interpretation I is determined by the contents of w:
I(w)(P) = T ⇔ P ∈ w:
Note that the interpretation I of the atomic propositions in the canonical model is
de4ned by the contents of w, in exactly the same way that the interpretation I of
the atomic relation symbols is de4ned from the contents of the set 
 in the classical
4rst-order Henkin construction.
In fact, we can view the canonical model construction as an adaptation of Henkin’s
construction to modal logic and Kripke models. In particular, if we carry out Henkin’s
construction for classical propositional logic, the resulting set 
 is a maximal consistent
set. Whereas this single maximal consistent set suOces to build a classical model, we
need multiple maximal consistent sets to build a Kripke model with multiple worlds.
For the canonical model, we take all maximal consistent sets. Then the interpretation
I and the possibility relation R are de4ned so that a Truth Lemma goes through, just
as it did in Henkin’s construction.
Lemma 2.7 (Truth Lemma). For every sentence 	 and every world w in the canonical
model M ,
(M;w) |= 	 ⇔ 	 ∈ w:
Clearly the canonical model is a model of T , since we took as the possible worlds
the maximal consistent sets containing T . Hence, the canonical model for T is indeed
a model of T .
Now consider the e#ective content of the canonical model construction. We saw that
the classical Henkin construction can be easily “e#ectivized” for a decidable classical
4rst-order theory T . But for decidable modal theory T , the canonical model construction
cannot simply be e#ectivized to produce a decidable model, because of the “top down”
manner in which it is de4ned. The possible worlds are de4ned as all maximal consistent
sets, which does not give an e#ective enumeration of the set of possible worlds. Nor
does it give an e#ective account of the contents of each maximal consistent set, which
is necessary in order to make truth in the model decidable (via the Truth Lemma).
Finally, the possibility relation is put in after the possible worlds have been de4ned,
according to a syntactic relation between the maximal consistent sets which appears to
be undecidable.
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We will 4x this by building a Kripke model of T which is similar to the canonical
model; but we will construct the model from the “bottom up.” We will construct just
the maximal consistent sets we need, e#ectively enumerating the sets and their contents
in the course of the construction. Moreover, the possibility relation between these sets
will be present as we construct them. All this will make the resulting Kripke model
decidable.
3. An e"ective completeness theorem
In this section we will prove our main result (Theorem 3.11): every decidable theory
of modal logic has a decidable Kripke model. We motivate our proof by 4rst sketching
how we propose to carry out an e#ective “bottom-up” version of the canonical model
construction.
3.1. Proposed construction
Suppose T is a decidable theory in a 4rst-order modal language L. We begin by
4xing a computable set of new constants C, and an e#ective enumeration 	0; 	1; 	2; : : :
of the sentences in the extended language L∪C.
So far the setup is exactly as for the classical 4rst-order Henkin construction. The
new constants C will serve as the elements of the model, and the construction will con-
sist primarily of satisfying completeness requirements with respect to the enumeration
of sentences.
We will build a Kripke model with multiple worlds, but since we want to build it
from the “bottom up,” we will begin with only a single world. Call it w0. As in the
canonical model, each possible world will be a set of sentences. But now we want
to e#ectively enumerate the contents of each possible world, so initially w0 is empty.
We then start satisfying completeness requirements at w0, and adding Henkin witnesses
from C for existential sentences.
Recall that the Henkin witnesses are needed in order to satisfy the Truth Lemma.
We will want our Kripke model M to satisfy a Truth Lemma as well. Thus, if we put
a sentence ∃ x (x)∈w0, then we want to make sure that (M;w0) |=∃ x (x). To that
end, we put  (c)∈w0 for some “new” c∈C.
Now let us turn to the important new aspect of modal logic: the modalities. The
semantics of the  modality are very similar to those of the existential quanti4er. As
is often remarked, the  modality acts as a sort of existential quanti4er on possible
worlds. So we will need to satisfy Henkin witness requirements for -formulas—but
with respect to possible worlds. We need to do this to satisfy the semantics of the
 modality: if we put a sentence  ∈w0, we need to make sure that (M;w0) |=   .
To that end, we create a new world w1 such that (w0; w1)∈R and  ∈w1. We call w1
a -witness, since it witnesses the semantics of  ∈w0.
Once we have created a new world w1, we need to start building a complete diagram
at w1 also. If in doing so we add a -formula  to w0 or w1, we create a new world
w3, accessible from w0 or w1, respectively, with ∈w3.
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Fig. 1. Sketch of a 4nite Kripke diagram.
Thus, at each stage of the construction we will have a 4nite graph, consisting of
4nitely many “existing worlds” w0; w1; : : : ; wp and a 4nite possibility relation R. We
will need to build a complete diagram for each such existing world, so we will need
to satisfy each completeness requirement at each existing world over the course of
the construction. Moreover, whenever we add a -formula to an existing world, we
immediately create a new world as a successor to that existing world, as a -witness;
that is how the possibility relation R is built up. In summary, at each stage we will
have a 4nite approximation to a Kripke model.
We may depict such an approximation by a 4nite (directed) graph, as in Fig. 1. Here,
the existing worlds w0; w1; : : : ; w8 are 4nite sets of sentences—namely, the sentences
we have added to satisfy completeness requirements at those worlds, and subsequently
from satisfying Henkin and -witness requirements. The arrows represent the relation
R, built up by creating -witnesses.
Thus, w1 and w3 were created as -witnesses for sentences added to w0, meaning
there are sentences  ; ∈w0 such that  ∈w1 and ∈w3. Similarly, w2; w4 and w5
were created as -witnesses for sentences added to w3; w6 was created as a -witness
for a sentence added to w3; w7 and w8 were created as -witnesses for sentences added
to w6.
3.2. Finite Kripke diagrams
According to this construction sketch, each 4nite stage will produce a certain kind
of 4nite approximation to a Kripke model. The classical Henkin construction also
produced a 4nite approximation to (the complete diagram of) a classical 4rst-order
model at each stage, consisting of a 4nite set of sentences ({ 0;  1; : : : ;  n−1} in the
notation of Construction 2.1). We refer to those sets as “4nite diagrams,” since they
are 4nite approximations to the complete diagram of the model.
In the modal case, the 4nite approximations to the Kripke model will be objects
of the kind described above: a 4nite number of 4nite sets of sentences, together with
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a binary possibility relation on those sets. These will be the primary objects in the
construction, which we call 4nite Kripke diagrams.
Denition 3.1. A ;nite Kripke diagram (FKD) D=(W = {w0; : : : ; wn}; R) for a modal
language L consists of a 4nite set of existing worlds W , where each wi ∈W is a 4nite
set of sentences of L; and a binary relation R⊆W×W .
As in Fig. 1, we can view a FKD D=(W;R) as a 4nite graph with nodes W and
edge relation R, with a 4nite number of sentences (the contents of wi) associated with
each node wi ∈W . Also note that in the construction we have proposed, R is extended
only when we add new worlds as immediate R-successors to existing worlds. Thus,
the graph (W;R) will be a tree for each FKD we construct, as in Fig. 1. We call these
tree FKDs; unless otherwise speci4ed, each FKD we discuss will be a tree FKD.
We plan to extend a given FKD D=(W;R) during a given stage in the construction
by satisfying the eth completeness requirement at some existing world wi ∈W . But we
must take care to do that in such a way that the contents of the various existing worlds
do not contradict each other. For example, consider the FKD shown in Fig. 2.
Clearly we want to avoid constructing a FKD such as this one, since it cannot
lead to a model M which satis4es the Truth Lemma: there is no such model M such
that (w0; w1); (w1; w2)∈R and in which (M;w0) |= 	, (M;w1) |= (¬	 ∨ ¬ ), and
(M;w2) |=  .
This example illustrates that the contents of di#erent existing worlds in W can
“interact” via the possibility relation R and the modalities of the language. Thus, when
we go to extend the contents of a given existing world wi, we have to somehow take
into account the contents of the other worlds in W as well.
What is it about the FKD in Fig. 2 that we want to avoid? In the classical Henkin
construction, we extended the 4nite diagrams in such a way as to maintain “semantical
consistency.” The construction ensured that there is always some model of T in which
all of the sentences in the 4nite diagram were simultaneously true.
We must do something similar in the modal case. We must be sure that there is a
Kripke model which “witnesses” each FKD we build, in the following sense.
Denition 3.2. A Kripke model M =(WM; RM ; : : :) witnesses a FKD D=(WD; RD) via
f if M is a model for the language of D and f :WD→WM is a map such that
• if (wi; wj)∈RD, then (f(wi); f(wj))∈RM ;
• if 	∈wi, then (M;f(wi)) |=	.
Denition 3.3. A FKD D is T -consistent if there exists a Kripke model M of T which
witnesses D.
Fig. 2. An FKD to avoid.
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Thus, the FKD in Fig. 2 is not T -consistent (for any theory T ), since no Kripke
model witnesses it.
3.3. The key step
Suppose we have a T -consistent FKD Dn at the beginning of stage n of the pro-
posed construction. Our main task in stage n will be to satisfy some eth completeness
requirement at some existing world wi of Dn, i.e., we must add either 	e or ¬	e to
wi. Moreover, we must e=ectively decide which to add, and we must choose so that
the new “extended diagram” is also T -consistent.
Because we will repeatedly refer to such extended diagrams, we introduce a notation
for them. For a FKD D=(W = {w0; : : : ; wn}; R) and a sentence 	, let D + {	∈wi}
denote the FKD
(W = {w0; : : : ; wi−1; wi ∪ {	}; wi+1; : : : ; wn}; R)
i.e., the result of extending D by adding 	 to wi.
Thus, at stage n we must e#ectively determine that either Dn + {	e ∈wi} is T -
consistent, or that Dn+{¬	e ∈wi} is T -consistent. Notice that since Dn is T -consistent,
we know that at least one of them is T -consistent. We reason as follows. Since Dn is
T -consistent, there is a Kripke model M of T which witnesses Dn via f. Now either
(M;f(wi)) |=	e or (M;f(wi)) |=¬	e. Hence, M also witnesses either Dn + {	e ∈wi}
or Dn + {¬	e ∈wi}, also via f.
So the key to the construction is to be able to e#ectively decide whether Dn +
{	e ∈wi} is T -consistent. If it is, then we can set Dn+1 =Dn+{	e ∈wi}. On the other
hand, if Dn+{	e ∈wi} is not T -consistent, then Dn+{¬	e ∈wi} must be T -consistent,
and so we can set Dn+1 =Dn + {	e ∈wi}.
Now recall the analogous step of the classical Henkin construction. There, the De-
duction Theorem allowed us to make this decision e#ectively. The 4nite diagram at
stage n is just { 0; : : : ;  n−1}, and the extended diagram is simply { 0; : : : ;  n−1}∪ {	e}.
Note that { 0; : : : ;  n−1}∪ {	e} is T -consistent (i.e., there is classical 4rst-order model
A such that A |=  0 ∧ · · · ∧  n−1 ∧ 	e) i# it is not the case that every model of
T ∪{ 0; : : : ;  n−1} is also a model of ¬	e, i.e., T ∪{ 0; : : : ;  n−1} |=¬	e. By the De-
duction Theorem, this is equivalent to
T |= n → ¬	e;
where n =  0∧· · ·∧ n−1. Since T is decidable, it followed that the decision about 	e is
decidable. Thus, the Deduction Theorem for classical 4rst-order logic is used to decide
semantic consistency via a syntactic criterion: { 0; : : : ;  n−1}∪ {	e} is (semantically)
T -consistent i# T ∪{n} |=¬	e i# T |= n→¬	e, where the last equivalency follows
from the Deduction Theorem.
Now suppose we rephrase the syntactic criterion, by noting that the implication
n→¬	e is equivalent to ¬(n∧	e). Hence, in the classical case, we can T -consistently
to add 	e to the given 4nite diagram n i#
T |= ¬(n ∧ 	e):
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Instead of asking if the 4nite diagram n implies ¬	e (over T ), we ask if n∧	e, which
represents the extended diagram { 0; : : : ;  n−1}∪ {	e}, is “syntactically T -consistent.” 3
This is the point of view we will generalize to handle the modal case. We will add
	e to the current FKD—but now at a particular world wi—and then check whether the
resulting 4nite diagram is T -consistent.
To make this decision e#ectively, we need to syntactically “represent” a 4nite Kripke
diagram within the modal language L. That will allow us to use the decidability of the
theory T to (syntactically) decide its (semantic) consistency. In the case of classical
logic, a 4nite diagram is represented by simply the conjunction of its contents (n∧	e
above); the situation for modal logic is more complicated.
3.4. The representing formula and the testing lemma
We showed in the previous section that we will be able to carry out the key step of
the construction if we can syntactically represent a given FKD in such a way that we
can use the decidability of T to e#ectively decide whether the FKD is T -consistent.
We shall de4ne a formula D which represents a tree FKD D in this sense: D is
T -consistent i# T |=¬D. We will use the tree structure of D to de4ne D.
Denition 3.4. Suppose we have a tree FKD D=(W = {w0; : : : ; wn}; R) with root node
w0. We associate with each existing world wi a formula i, de4ned by induction as
follows:
• If wi is a leaf node, then i =
∧{	 |	∈wi}.
• If wi is a not a leaf, then i =
∧
({	 |	∈wi}∪ {j | (wi; wj)∈R}).
Finally, let D =0, the formula associated with the root node. We call D the
representing formula of D.
We have de4ned the formulas i recursively, with the leaves of the tree as the base
case. We can view the formula i as encoding the part of the FKD “in front of” wi,
i.e., at wi and at all worlds reachable from wi via R. As we work our way back from
the leaves to the root, the result is the formula D, which carries all the information
of the entire FKD. This idea is made precise by Lemma 3.5, which shows that D is
precisely what we need to test the T -consistency of a FKD D.
First, let us present an example. Consider the FKD D presented in Fig. 3. In this
example, 2 =	2 ∧  2 ∧ 2, 4 =	4 ∧  4, and 5 = 5; so
1 =	1 ∧  1 ∧ 2 ∧ 4 ∧ 5
=	1 ∧  1 ∧ (	2 ∧  2 ∧ 2) ∧ (	4 ∧  4) ∧ 5:
3 In fact, we might argue that this is a more natural view, since { 0; : : : ;  n−1}∪ {	e} is T -consistent i#
there is classical 4rst-order model A of T such that A |= n ∧ 	e; i.e., i# T |=¬(n ∧ 	e).
S. Ganguli, A. Nerode / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 128 (2004) 141–195 153
Fig. 3. FKD D for representing formula example.
Also, 7 =	7 ∧  7 ∧ 7 and 8 =  8, so
6 =  6 ∧ 6 ∧ 7 ∧ 8
=  6 ∧ 6 ∧ (	7 ∧  7 ∧ 7) ∧ ( 8):
and so
3 =	3 ∧ 6
=	3 ∧ ( 6 ∧ 6 ∧ (	7 ∧  7 ∧ 7) ∧  8):
Finally
D = 0 =	0 ∧ 1 ∧ 3
=	0 ∧ (	1 ∧  1 ∧ (	2 ∧  2 ∧ 2) ∧ (	4 ∧  4) ∧ 5) ∧
(	3 ∧ ( 6 ∧ 6 ∧ (	7 ∧  7 ∧ 7) ∧ :   8)):
Lemma 3.5 (Testing Lemma). For a FKD D=(WD; RD) and a theory T , the follow-
ing are equivalent:
(1) D is T -consistent, i.e., there exists a Kripke model of T witnessing D,
(2) T |=¬D.
Proof. Recall that T |=¬D i# there is a Kripke model M =(WM; : : :) and a world
w∈WM such that M |=T but (M;w) |=D.
• (1 ⇒ 2) Suppose M =(WM; RM ; : : :) is a Kripke model which witnesses D via
f :WD→WM . Using induction on the tree structure of D, working from the leaves
back to the root, we show that (M;f(wi)) |=i for each wi ∈WD.
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◦ If wi is a leaf in D: since M witnesses D, (M;f(wi)) |=	 for each 	∈wi. But
i is merely the conjunction of all such 	, so (M;f(wi)) |=i.
◦ For all other wi in D, we just have to show that (M;f(wi)) |= j for each wj
such that (wi; wj)∈RD. Since M witnesses D, (f(wi); f(wj))∈RM for each such
wj; and by the inductive hypothesis, (M;f(wj)) |=j. Hence (M;f(wi)) |=  j,
as desired.
We have shown that (M;f(wi)) |=i for each wi ∈WD. In particular, (M;f(w0))
|=D. Since M |=T by assumption, we have that T |=¬D.
• (2 ⇒ 1) Suppose that T |=¬D. Then there is a Kripke model M =(WM; RM ; : : :)
with some w∈WM such that (M;w) |=D. We claim that M witnesses D via a
function f :WD→WM , which we de4ne by induction. In this case we work from
the root w0 out to the leaves of tree, “unwinding” the nested diamonds in D as we
go. As we de4ne f, we also show that (M;f(wi)) |=i for each wi ∈WD:
◦ Base case (i=0): For the root node w0, set f(w0)=w. Note that (M;w) |=0
by assumption.
◦ Inductive step: Take a world wi which has a parent wj, i.e., (wj; wi)∈RD. By
induction, f(wj) is a world in M such that (M;f(wj)) |=j. Note that j is a
conjunction which includes among its conjuncts i (since (wj; wi)∈RD). Hence,
(M;f(wj)) |= i, so there exists some w′ ∈WM such that (f(wj); w′)∈RM and
(M;w′) |=i. Fix such a w′ and set f(wi)=w′.
Since the representing formula D allows us to test the T -consistency of a FKD D,
we can use it to carry out the construction which proves the e#ective completeness
theorem for modal logic.
3.5. The construction
Construction 3.6. Suppose T is a decidable theory in a 4rst-order modal language L.
Moreover, assume T has a Kripke model. The construction will produce a Kripke
model M such that M is a decidable model of T .
Begin by 4xing a computable set of new constants C and an e#ective enumeration
	0; 	1; 	2; : : : of all sentences in the extended language L(T )∪C. Also 4x a recursive
function  :N→N×N. In stage n we will compute  (n)= (i; e), and then satisfy the
completeness requirement with respect to 	e at wi in stage n, provided that wi exists at
stage n. To make sure that we satisfy each completeness requirement at each possible
world, we 4x  such that for each pair (i; e)∈N×N there are in4nitely many n∈N
with  (n)= (i; e). Then, no matter when in the construction wi is created, there will
be a later stage n at which we satisfy the eth completeness requirement at wi.
We will construct a sequence of FKDs Dn =(Wn = {wn0 ; : : : ; wnp}; Rn), from which we
will de4ne a Kripke model M . An existing world wni of Dn will correspond to a world
wi in the model M . The contents of wni are the sentences that will be true at wi in M ;
we will refer to them as the sentences associated with wi (as of stage n).
Stage −1: D0 = ({w00 = ∅}; R0 = ∅).
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Stage n: By induction, we have a FKD Dn =(Wn = {wn0 ; : : : ; wnp}; Rn). Compute  (n)
= (i; e). If i ¿ p, do nothing at this stage except update indices: put Dn+1 = (Wn+1 =
{wn+10 ; : : : ; wn+1p }; Rn+1), with wn+1j =wnj (for j=0; : : : ; p), Rn+1 =Rn, and go on to
stage n+ 1.
If i6p, then we shall satisfy the eth completeness requirement at wi. Let D=Dn +
{	e ∈wni }. Using the decidability of T , e#ectively check whether T |=¬D.
(1) If T |=¬D, let Dn+1 = ({wn+10 ; : : : ; wn+1p }; Rn+1) with wn+1i =wni ∪{¬	e}; wn+1j =
wnj for j = i; and Rn+1 =Rn, i.e., we associate ¬	e with wi.
(Since this type of situation will arise repeatedly, we abbreviate it by saying:
“set Dn+1 =Dn + {¬	e ∈wni } and update the indices from n to n+ 1.”)
(2) If T |=¬D, we associate 	e with wi. We also satisfy a Henkin witness or a
-witness requirement for 	e at wi if necessary:
• if 	e =∃ x (x), let Dn+1 =Dn + {	e;  (cj)∈wni } where cj is the least element
of C not occurring in Dn, and update indices. (So cj is a Henkin witness for
∃x (x)∈wi.)
• if 	e =   , let Dn+1 = ({wn+10 ; : : : ; wn+1p ; wn+1p+1}; Rn+1) where wn+1i =wni ∪{	e};
wn+1p+1 = { }; wn+1j =wnj for j = i; p + 1; and Rn+1 =Rn ∪{(wi; wp+1)}. (We have
created a new world wp+1 which serves as a “-witness” for  ∈wi.)
• Otherwise, just let Dn+1 =Dn + {	e ∈wni } and update indices.
It should be clear that the Dn form an increasing sequence, in two senses. Suppose
Dn =(Wn = {wn0 ; : : : ; wnp}; Rn), Dm =(Wm = {wm0 ; : : : ; wmq }; Rm) with n6m. Then:
• the trees underlying the diagrams are increasing: p6q, and (wni ; wnj )∈Rn implies
(wmi ; w
m
j )∈Rm
• the sets of sentences associated with wi are increasing: wni ⊆wmi for i=0; : : : ; p.
Now we collect all the sentences associated with a world wi throughout the construction.
In keeping with the notation of the canonical model, we call this collection wi. For
each i such that wni occurs in some Dn, let
wi =
∞⋃
n=1
wni :
Now we de4ne the Kripke model M =(W;R;D; I):
• the set of possible worlds is W = {wi :wni occurs in some Dn}
• the possibility relation R is de4ned from the diagrams Dn in the obvious way:
(wi; wj) ∈ R ⇔ (wni ; wnj ) ∈ Rn for some n
• the domain D is the set of new constants C
• the interpretation I is de4ned from the syntactic contents of the wi, just as in the
canonical model: for an n-place relation symbol P, n-tuple Nc of elements of C, and
possible world wi ∈W ,
Nc ∈ I(wi)(P) ⇔ P( Nc) ∈ wi:
156 S. Ganguli, A. Nerode / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 128 (2004) 141–195
3.6. The consistency and closure lemmas
Lemma 3.7 (Consistency Lemma). Each FKD Dn is T -consistent.
Proof. By induction on n:
Base case: D0 is T -consistent since T has a model by hypothesis.
Induction step: Assume Dn is T -consistent. To show that Dn+1 is T -consistent, look
at how Dn is extended to Dn+1 at stage n. (Recall that we used the notation D=Dn +
{	e ∈wni }.)
(1) In the case that T |=¬D, we set Dn+1 =Dn+{¬	e ∈wni }. By the Testing Lemma,
no model of T witnesses D. Since Dn is T -consistent, there is some model M of
T which witnesses Dn. Then (M;f(wni )) |=	e (if it did, M would witness D). So
(M;f(wni )) |=¬	e, meaning that M also witnesses Dn+1.
(2) In the case that T |=¬D, we set Dn+1 =Dn+{	e ∈wni }. By the Testing Lemma,
there is a model M of T which witnesses D. We claim that M also witnesses
Dn+1. Note that since M witnesses D, (M;f(wni )) |=	e.
• if 	e =∃ x (x): since (M;f(wni )) |=	e, there is an element a in the domain of M
such that (M;f(wni )) |=  (ca). Then we can extend M to a model which witnesses
Dn+1 by putting I(cj)= a.
• if 	e =  : since (M;f(wni )) |=	e, there is some world w of M such that (f(wni );
w)∈RM and (M;w) |=  . Then M witnesses Dn+1 if we expand f by mapping the
new wn+1p+1 to some such “-witness” w.
• If 	e is not an existential nor a diamond sentence, M witnesses Dn+1 =Dn +
{	e ∈wni } simply because (M;f(wni )) |=	e.
We wish to prove the Truth Lemma for M . To do so, we show that the wi have
certain closure properties.
Lemma 3.8 (Closure Lemma). The following are true for each wi ∈W :
(1) For each sentence 	 in the extended language L∪C, exactly one of 	 or ¬	 is
in wi;
(2) (	 ∧  )∈wi ⇔ 	∈wi and  ∈wi;
(3) ∃ x (x)∈wi ⇔ there exists c∈C such that  (c)∈wi;
(4)  ∈wi ⇔ there exists wj ∈W such that (wi; wj)∈R and  ∈wj;
(5)  ∈wi ⇔  ∈wj for every wj ∈W such that (wi; wj)∈R;
(6) T ⊆wi.
Proof.
(1) Find n large enough such that wni exists in Dn, n=(i; e), and 	=	e. Such an n
exists by the properties  . By the construction, either 	e ∈wn+1i or ¬	e ∈wn+1i .
If both 	∈wi and ¬	∈wi, then they are both in some wni . But this contradicts
the T -consistency of Dn: clearly there is no model M with a world f(wni ) such
that (M;f(wni )) |=	 and (M;f(wni )) |=¬	.
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(2) (⇒) Suppose (	 ∧  )∈wi but 	 =∈wi. By (1), ¬	∈wi. Then (	 ∧  );¬	∈wni
for some n. But this contradicts the T -consistency of Dn. Hence, 	∈wi. Similarly
for  .
(⇐) Suppose 	;  ∈wi but (	 ∧  ) =∈wi. Then ¬(	 ∧  )∈wi. This contradicts
the T -consistency of some Dn.
(3) (⇒) Suppose ∃ x (x)∈wi. Then ∃ x (x) is added to wni for some n. Then  (c) is
also added to wni in the construction for some c∈C (to ful4ll the Henkin witness
requirement).
(⇐) Suppose  (c)∈wi for some c∈C but ∃ x (x) =∈wi. Then ¬∃ x (x)∈wi.
This contradicts the T -consistency of some Dn.
(4) (⇒) Suppose  ∈wi. Then  is added to wni for some n. Then in the construction
there is a newly existing world wn+1j in Dn+1 with  ∈wn+1j and (wni ; wnj )∈Rn (to
ful4ll the -witness requirement). Thus, there is a wj as required.
(⇐) Suppose there is a wj such that (wi; wj)∈R and  ∈wj, but  =∈wi. Then
¬   ∈wi. So there is an n such that ¬   ∈wni ; (wni ; wnj )∈Rn and  ∈wnj . This
contradicts the T -consistency of Dn: clearly there is no model M with worlds f(wni )
and f(wnj ) such that (M;f(w
n
i )) |=¬   ; (f(wni ); f(wnj ))∈R and (M;f(wnj )) |=  .
(5) (⇒) Suppose  ∈wi but  =∈wj for some wj such that (wi; wj)∈R. Then there
is an n such that  ∈wni ; (wni ; wnj )∈Rn and ¬ ∈wnj . This contradicts the T -
consistency of Dn.
(⇐) Suppose  =∈wi. Then ¬  ∈wi. Then ¬ ∈wi also (if not, then the
consistency of some Dn is violated). By (4), there is a wj such that (wi; wj)∈R
and ¬ ∈wj, meaning  =∈wj.
(6) Suppose 	∈T but 	 =∈wi. Then ¬	∈wi, and so ¬	∈wni for some n. But this
contradicts the T -consistency of Dn: if M is a model of T which witnesses Dn,
then (M;f(wni )) |=	 (since 	∈T ) and (M;f(wni )) |=¬	 (since M supposedly
witnesses Dn).
3.7. The truth lemma
As with a canonical model, we have a Truth Lemma for the model M . Since we
e#ectively enumerated the contents of the wi in the construction, this will lead to the
result we have been working towards—that M is a decidable model of T .
Lemma 3.9 (Truth Lemma). For each wi ∈W and each sentence 	 of L(T )∪C,
(M;wi) |= 	 ⇔ 	 ∈ wi:
Proof. By induction on the structure of 	. The base case follows directly from the
de4nition of M , while each of the other cases follows from the inductive hypothesis
(IH) and the Closure Lemma (CL).
• 	 atomic: by de4nition of M . The atomic relations at world wi in M are de4ned
precisely by the contents of wi.
• 	=  ∧ : (M;wi) |=  ∧  i# (M;wi) |=  and (M;wi) |=  i#  ∈wi and ∈wi (IH)
i#  ∧ ∈wi (CL).
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• 	=¬ : (M;wi) |=¬ i# (M;wi) |=  i#  =∈wi (IH) i# ¬ ∈wi (CL).
• 	=∃ x (x) : (M;wi) |=∃ x (x) i# (M;wi) |=  (c) for some c∈C i#  (c)∈wi for
some c∈C (IH) i# ∃ x (x)∈wi (CL).
• 	=  : (M;wi) |=  i# (wi; wj)∈R and (M;wj) |=  for some wj ∈W i# (wi; wj)∈
R and  ∈wj for some wj ∈W (IH) i#  ∈wi (CL).
• 	=  : (M;wi) |=  i# (M;wj) |=  for every wj ∈W such that (wi; wj)∈R i#
 ∈wj for every wj ∈W such that (wi; wj)∈R (IH) i#  ∈wi (CL).
Corollary 3.10. M |=T .
Proof. By the Closure Lemma, T ⊆wi for each wi ∈W . Then the Truth Lemma implies
that (M;wi) |=	 for every 	∈T and every wi ∈W .
3.8. The e=ective completeness theorem
Theorem 3.11. Every decidable theory in a modal language L has a decidable Kripke
model.
Proof. For a decidable theory T , let M be the Kripke model produced by Construction
3.6. We claim that M is a decidable model of T . We observed above that M |=T . Now
we show that M is a decidable model.
• R is decidable: for any wi; wj ∈W , to decide whether (wi; wj)∈R, search for the
stage n of the construction in which wj was created. Then (wi; wj)∈R i# wj was
created as a -witness for wi at that stage.
• truth is decidable: by the Truth Lemma, (M;wi) |=	 i# 	∈wi, so we search for a
stage at which the completeness requirement for 	 is satis4ed for wi. That is, for
any wi ∈W and sentence 	 in L∪C, to decide whether (M;wi) |=	 we 4nd a stage
n such that  (n)= (i; e), wi exists at stage n, and 	=	e. Then (M;wi) |=	 i# 	e
is added to wi at stage n. Since such an n can be found e#ectively, it is decidable
whether (M;wi) |=	.
3.9. Global decidability
We have showed how to construct a decidable Kripke model of a given decidable
modal theory. Our de4nition of a decidable Kripke model is a model M in which
“truth at a world,” or “local truth,” is decidable: given a world w and a sentence 	, it
is decidable whether (M;w) |=	. We now call this a locally decidable model.
We will alter the construction to produce a model M in which “truth in the model,”
or “global truth,” is also decidable: given a sentence 	, it is decidable whether M |=	.
In particular, given a decidable modal theory T , we shall construct a model M such
that M |=	 i# T |=	.
Denition 3.12. A Kripke model M =(W;R;D; I) is globally decidable if the sets W;D
and the relation R are each computable, and truth in the model is decidable, i.e., the
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set
{	 : M |= 	}
is computable, where 	 ranges over the sentences of LD.
Recall that we constructed a locally decidable model by satisfying completeness
requirements at each wi. In stage n, we decided whether (M;wi) |=	e or (M;wi) |=¬	e,
for  (n)= (i; e). To construct a globally decidable model, we will include a stage for
each sentence 	e at which we will decide whether M |=	e or M |=¬	e. We will
do this by simply checking whether T |=	e. If so, we proceed as in the original
construction; then M |=	e, since we construct M so that it is a model of T . On the
other hand, if T |=	e, we ensure that M |=	e by creating a new world wi at which
(M;wi) |=	e. Unlike Construction 3.6, in which each new world was created as a
successor a previously existing world, this new wi will be “disconnected” from all
previously existing worlds. This means that instead of tree FKDs, this construction
will produce a sequence of “forest” FKDs, where each FKD consists of a (4nite) set
of trees.
Denition 3.13. (1) A FKD D=(W;R) is a forest FKD if each connected component
of the graph (W;R) is a tree FKD.
(2) A forest FKD is locally T -consistent if each connected component (considered
as a FKD) has a witnessing model which is a model of T .
We will not need the forest FKDs to be T -consistent in the sense of De4nition 3.2.
Local T -consistency will suOce to prove the necessary closure properties and hence
to de4ne the model.
Construction 3.14. As in the Construction 3.6, we begin by 4xing a new set of con-
stants C, and an e#ective enumeration 	0; 	1; : : : of all sentences in the extended lan-
guage L∪C. We de4ne a sequence of forest FKDs Dm as follows:
Stage −1: D0 = ({w00 = ∅}; R0 = ∅):
Stage m=2n + 1: By induction we have a forest FKD Dm. Satisfy the eth com-
pleteness requirement at wi, where  (n)= (i; e); to do so, proceed as in stage n of
Construction 3.6, using the representing formula of the tree FKD consisting of the
connected component containing wi. As Construction 3.6, this may include creating a
new world as a -witness.
Stage m=2n + 2: We have a forest FKD Dm =(W = {wm0 ; : : : ; wmp }; Rm). Using the
decidability of T , e#ectively check whether T |=	n.
(1) If T |=	n, set Dm+1 =Dm and update indices.
(2) If T |=	n, we shall associate ¬	n with a new world wp+1. Let Dm+1 = ({wm+10 ; : : : ;
wm+1p ; w
m+1
p+1}; Rm+1) where wm+1i =wmi for i=0; : : : ; p; wm+1p+1 = {¬	n}; and Rm+1
=Rm. Note that we do not extend the possibility relation in this case, so that the
new world wm+1p+1 is disconnected from all of the other existing worlds.
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Now de4ne a Kripke model M from this sequence of forest FKDs, in exactly the same
way that we de4ned a model from the sequence of tree FKDs in Construction 3.6.
We have constructed the forest FKDs Dm based on criteria which maintain local
T -consistency, so we have the following result.
Lemma 3.15 (Consistency Lemma). Each Dm is locally T -consistent.
Proof. By induction on m:
Base case: D0 is T -consistent since T has a model by assumption.
Induction step: Assume Dm is locally T -consistent. To show that Dm+1 is locally
T -consistent, look at how Dm is extended to Dm+1 at stage m:
Stage m = 2n+ 1: In this stage we satisfy the eth completeness requirement at wi,
where  (n) = (i; e), in the same way as in Construction 3.6. There we proved that this
preserves T -consistency. Now we start with a locally consistent FKD Dm = (W;R). So
the component of (W;R) containing wmi has a witnessing model. By the same reasoning
we provided in the original construction, the component has a witnessing model at the
conclusion of this stage. Since we make no changes to any of the other components,
Dm+1 is also locally T -consistent.
Stage m = 2n+ 2:
(1) In the case that T |=	n, we do nothing except update indices. So clearly the local
T -consistency of Dm implies Dm+1 is locally T -consistent.
(2) In the case that T |=	n, there is a model M of T with a world w such that
(M;w) |=¬	n. Thus, the connected component of Dm+1 containing wm+1p+1 (which
consists of just wp+1) is witnessed by M via f, where f(wp+1)=w. Since
the other components of Dm+1 are identical to those in Dm, Dm+1 is locally
T -consistent.
The statements and proofs of the Closure Lemma and the Truth Lemma are exactly
the same as before (Lemmas 3.8 and 3.9, respectively). We repeat the statements but
omit the proofs:
Lemma 3.16 (Closure Lemma). For each wi,
(1) For each sentence 	, exactly one of 	 or ¬	 is in wi.
(2) (	∧  )∈wi⇔	∈wi and  ∈wi.
(3) ∃ x (x)∈wi⇔ there is a c∈C such that  (c)∈wi.
(4)  ∈wi⇔ there is a wj such that (wi; wj)∈R and  ∈wj.
(5)  ∈wi⇔  ∈wj for every wj ∈W such that (wi; wj)∈R.
(6) T ⊆wi.
Lemma 3.17 (Truth Lemma). For each wi ∈W and sentence 	 of L(T )∪C,
(M;wi) |= 	 ⇔ 	 ∈ wi:
Finally, the following establishes that M is a globally decidable model:
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Theorem 3.18. M |=	 i= 	∈T .
Proof. (⇐) Suppose 	∈T . By the Closure Lemma, T ⊆wi for each wi ∈W . Hence,
	∈wi for each wi ∈W . By the Truth Lemma, (M;wi) |=	 for each wi ∈W , i.e., M |=	.
(⇒) Suppose 	 =∈T , i.e., T |=	. Find n such that 	=	n. Then, according to stage
m=2n + 2 of the construction, Dm+1 contains an existing world wm+1p+1 such that
¬	n ∈wm+1p+1 . By the Truth Lemma, (M;wp+1) |=¬	, so M |=	.
Theorem 3.19. Every decidable modal theory has a globally decidable model.
Note that the model M produced by Construction 3.14 is also locally decidable, by
the same arguments given in the proof of Theorem 3.11. Thus, we have proved that
every decidable modal theory has a Kripke model which is both locally decidable and
globally decidable.
4. The testing lemma: a deduction theorem on nite Kripke diagrams for modal logic
We have described the construction of a decidable Kripke model for a decidable
modal theory. We generalized the e#ective predicate Henkin construction. To do so, we
replaced the classical Deduction Theorem, which works with a statement as a premise,
by the Testing Lemma, which essentially has a 4nite approximation to a Kripke model
(a FKD) as a premise.
The predicate construction proceeded by e#ectively satisfying completeness require-
ments: a complete diagram of a model is built up by adding either 	 or ¬	 for each
sentence 	. The Deduction Theorem was used to decide how to satisfy each such re-
quirement. Given a 4nite approximation to a complete diagram, we used the Deduction
Theorem to decide whether to extend it by 	 or ¬	.
The modal construction also proceeded by e#ectively satisfying completeness require
ments—at each possible world that is constructed. The tools used to decide how to
do so were the representing formula of a FKD and the Testing Lemma. Now, given
a 4nite approximation to a model (a FKD), we use the Testing Lemma to determine
whether to extend it by 	 or ¬	 at a given possible world.
Thus, the predicate Deduction Theorem is replaced by the modal Testing Lemma
in the (e#ective) construction of a model. This functional similarity is evidence for
treating the Testing Lemma as the analogue, for modal logic, of the classical Deduction
Theorem. In this section we present further evidence for this view.
First, we will rephrase the Deduction Theorem for predicate logic. Then we will
introduce a tableau proof theory for modal logic, and adapt it for proofs within the
context of FKDs. This lets us extend the Testing Lemma to include a syntactic aspect
that deals with deductions. Finally, we examine how this extended version of the
Testing Lemma can be seen as a generalization of the Deduction Theorem to modal
logic.
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4.1. The deduction theorem for classical logic
We begin by stating the Deduction Theorem (DT) for classical 4rst-order logic.
Earlier, when we used the DT in the classical 4rst-order Henkin construction, we
cited just its semantic (model-theoretic) aspect. Now we add syntactic (proof-theoretic)
content. Then we rephrase the classical Deduction Theorem in an equivalent form which
will show its relationship with the modal Testing Lemma.
Theorem 4.1 (Deduction Theorem for classical 4rst-order logic). Fix a classical ;rst-
order language L. For a theory T, a ;nite set of sentences 
, and a sentence 	 (all
in the language L), the following are equivalent:
(1) T ∪
 |=	;
(2) T |=
→	;
(3) T 
→	;
(4) T ∪
	.
(Note that in (2) and (3) we let 
 represent the conjunction of that 4nite set of
sentences.)
Now let us make some modi4cations to the statement of the DT, with the intent of
bringing the form of the DT closer to that of the Testing Lemma (as stated in Lemma
3.5). First, we replace 	 by ¬	. So now the clauses of the DT are:
(1) T ∪
 |=¬	;
(2) T |=
→¬	;
(3) T 
→¬	;
(4) T ∪
  ¬	.
The next modi4cation is more signi4cant. In Section 3.3, we motivated the idea of the
representing formula of a FKD by replacing the implication 
→¬	 in the DT by the
equivalent ¬(
 ∧ 	).
Finally, we negate each of the clauses in the DT, i.e., we replace |= by |= in clauses
(1) and (2), and  by  in clauses (3) and (4). The DT now states that TFAE:
(1) T ∪
 |=¬	;
(2) T |=¬(
 ∧ 	);
(3) T  ¬(
 ∧ 	);
(4) T ∪
  ¬	.
Now we can begin to see the connection between the classical Deduction Theorem
and the modal Testing Lemma. First, think of the 4nite set of sentences 
 as the 4nite
diagram of a classical model: a “classical 4nite diagram.” Recall that this is exactly
how the DT is used in the classical Henkin construction, as we noted in our discussion
in Section 3.3. Then the conjunction 
 ∧ 	 in clauses (2) and (3) of the DT is the
formula representing 
 extended by 	. We are justi4ed in calling the conjunction 
∧	
the representing formula if we think of such a classical 4nite diagram as a FKD with
a single existing world. Then, according to De4nition 3.4, the representing formula of
such a FKD is indeed the conjunction of the formulas at that single world.
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On the other hand, D in clause (2) of the Testing Lemma is the representing
formula of a FKD D. So if we think of the 4nite classical diagram 
∪{	} as corre-
sponding to a 4nite Kripke diagram D, both clauses (2) say the same thing: that the
negation of the representing formula of a 4nite diagram is not a consequence of T . Or,
in other words, that the representing formula of the 4nite diagram is satis;able with
respect to T .
Meanwhile, clause (1) of the DT says that ¬	 is not a consequence of T ∪
, i.e.,
that there is a model of T ∪
 which also satis4es 	. To see how this relates to the
modal Testing Lemma, note that this is the same as saying that there is a model of
T which satis4es, or “witnesses,” 
∪{	}. Once again, we are justi4ed in using this
terminology we introduced if we think of 
∪{	} as a FKD with a single world. Then
a witnessing model is a Kripke model with some world which satis4es all of 
∪{	};
this world in the witnessing model yields a classical model which satis4es 
∪{	}.
Thus, clause (1) of the DT corresponds to clause (1) of the Testing Lemma: both say
that there is a model of T which witnesses a 4nite diagram.
In summary, the Testing Lemma is a modal version of the equivalence of (1) and
(2) above, which is the semantic part of the classical DT. This is the 4rst evidence
that the Testing Lemma should be treated as a Deduction Theorem for modal logic.
Next we will add clauses (3) and (4) to the modal Testing Lemma. For these we need
a proof theory.
4.2. Modal tableau proofs
Historically, modal logics were 4rst examined from a syntactic viewpoint, i.e., proof-
theoretically, prior to the development of possible worlds semantics. For example,
the well-known modal logics K;T;S4, etc. were originally formulated as axiomatic
systems.
Axiomatic proof systems for modal logics continue to be used and studied. Subse-
quent to the development of possible worlds semantics, however, an alternative style
of proof theory was developed: tableau systems. Tableau proofs for modal logics dif-
fer signi4cantly from axiomatic proofs, in that the tableaux make explicit mention of
possible worlds and a possibility relation. There are two kinds of entries on a modal
tableau:
• truth statements of the form Tw |=	 or Fw |=	, which is meant to assert that a
formula 	 is true or false in a possible world w;
• accessibility statements of the form wRw′, which is meant to assert that a world w′
is accessible from another world w.
On the other hand, axiomatic proof systems for modal logics make no mention of
possible worlds or a possibility relation. Entries in an axiomatic proof are just formulas,
detached from any possible worlds or a possibility relation. In terms of the semantics,
this is because the entries in an axiomatic proof are supposed to hold globally, at every
possible world.
By contrast, we wish to work with proofs within FKDs, which consist of formulas
associated with speci4c existing worlds, and a possibility relation between those worlds.
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Thus, tableau proofs are better suited for our purposes, since they possess precisely the
structure needed to work with FKDs syntactically.
For the basics of modal tableau proofs, we refer to Chapter 4 of [10]. In particular,
we will use the de4nitions of the following:
• modal tableau;
• contradictory path, tableau;
• tableau proof;
• tableau from (global) premises;
• complete systematic tableau.
Consult also [3,4] for further information on tableau proofs for modal logic.
4.3. Tableau deductions from a FKD
We now adapt modal tableaux for constructing proofs using FKDs, with the goal
of using tableau deductions in our construction of a Kripke model. At each stage of
the construction, we have to determine whether we can add a sentence 	 to an exist-
ing world wi of a FKD D. In Section 3 we described a way to do this semantically,
using the concepts of witnessing models and representing formulas. Now we will de-
scribe a way to do this syntactically, using the concept of tableau deductions from a
FKD.
For example, consider the FKD D of (Fig. 4).
Suppose we want to satisfy the completeness requirement with respect to  at w1,
i.e., we want to add either  or ¬ to w1.
We can see semantically that we cannot put  ∈w1: there cannot be a witnessing
model M in which (M;f(w1)) |=	∧ , (M;f(w0)) |=¬(	∧ ), and (f(w0); f(w1))∈
R. This is reAected by the fact that the representing formula D+{ ∈w1}=¬ (	∧ )∧
(	 ∧  ) is not satis4able, i.e., |=¬D+{ ∈w1}.
Now we can make the argument syntactically, with a tableau proof:
Here, entries (1)–(3) are from the original FKD D, while entry (4) is the added
assumption  ∈w1, which we are testing. From these premises we produce a contra-
dictory tableau. We shall see that this proves that D + { ∈w1} has no witnessing
model.
Or, if we add Fw1 |=¬ at the root as entry (0), then we have a tableau proof of
w1 |=¬ from premises (1)–(3) of the FKD D. Entry (4) arises from developing the
root entry (0) with the (F¬) rule.
This indicates how to use tableau deductions within the construction. We must use
a new kind of tableau deduction, in which premises are provided by a FKD.
First, we de4ne the stem of a tableau % as the set of entries which appear on every
path through %. Intuitively, we think of the stem as consisting of the root plus the
Fig. 4. A simple FKD.
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Fig. 5. A tableau deduction from a FKD.
entries which lie in a straight line below the root, above the 4rst branching in the
tableau. In the tableau in Fig. 5, the stem consists of entries (1)–(6).
Denition 4.2. Let D=(WD = {w0; : : : ; wn}; RD) be a FKD.
(1) The entries from D consists of the following set of tableau entries:
{Twi |= 	 |wi ∈ WD; 	 ∈ wi} ∪ {wiRwj | (wi; wj) ∈ RD}:
(2) A tableau from D is any tableau which contains on its stem all the entries
from D.
As we noted earlier, tableau entries have exactly the right structure for expressing
the contents of a FKD. If 	∈wi, we think that 	 is true at a world wi. That is
expressed by a tableau entry Twi |=	. And clearly the entries wiRwj represent the
binary relation RD within a tableau. For reasoning within a FKD D, we want all this
information—namely, all of the entries from D—to be present on the stem.
In Fig. 5, entries (1)–(3) constitute the entries from D. Since these are on the stem,
we have a tableau from D. Note that, as in this example, a tableau from D may have
other entries besides the entries from D on its stem. 4
4 An alternative de4nition would follow the de4nition of a tableau from global premises. Instead of
requiring that all the entries from D be on the stem, we would allow any path to be extended by any entry
from D. The given de4nition of course encompasses this alternative one, since we can always repeat any
entry from the stem along any path. But with the alternative de4nition we would have to specify that the
“new” worlds and constants introduced by developing (T
); (F ); (T∃); (F∀) entries are new with respect
to D. By placing all of D on the stem, we guarantee that the new worlds and constants will be new to D.
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Denition 4.3. Suppose D=(WD; RD) be a FKD. For wi ∈W and a formula 	, a
tableau deduction of wi |=	 from D is a contradictory tableau from D with root
Fwi |=	.
We can allow the presence of a set of “global” premises T in the standard way,
which will be needed for our construction of a Kripke model of a theory T . Thus,
we will be interested in what we call tableau deductions from (a FKD) D and
(a theory) T .
Now we can sketch the connection between such tableau deductions and the seman-
tic consistency of FKDs. Suppose we have produced a FKD Dn as in Construction 3.6
such that there is a tableau deduction of wi |=¬	 from D and T . We will show that
such a tableau deduction establishes syntactically that D+{	∈wi} is not T -consistent.
On the other hand, if wi |=¬	 is not tableau deducible from D and T , then the com-
plete systematic tableau from D and T with root Fwi |=¬	 is noncontradictory. A
noncontradictory path through this tableau yields a countermodel of T which witnesses
D+ {	∈wi}. Thus, tableau deductions are another way of completing the “key step”
of the construction, as discussed in Section 3.3.
4.4. The testing lemma revisited
We have sketched a proof that the following are equivalent:
• D + {	∈wi} is T -consistent;
• wi |=¬	 is not tableau deducible from D and T .
The 4rst clause here is also the 4rst clause in the Testing Lemma, and it is precisely
the condition we need to test in the construction of a Kripke model. So now we
have a syntactic clause to add to the Testing Lemma. We will see that it matches up
with the last clause of the classical Deduction Theorem: T ∪
  ¬	. So the remaining
line of the classical Deduction Theorem to account for within the modal context is
T  ¬(
 ∧ 	).
Recall that we looked at (
 ∧ 	) as the formula representing the extended 4nite
diagram 
+ {	}. In the modal case, we have the extended FKD D+ {	∈wi}, which
has representing formula D+{	∈wi}. This leads us to the 4nal clause of the modal
Testing Lemma: T  ¬D+{	∈wi}. So we now have an extended version of the Testing
Lemma:
Theorem 4.4 (Testing Lemma). Fix a ;rst-order modal language L. For a theory T ,
a tree FKD D, and a sentence 	 (all in the language L), the following are equivalent:
(1) D + {	∈wi} is T -consistent, i.e., there exists a Kripke model of T witnessing
D + {	∈wi};
(2) T |=¬D+{	∈wi};
(3) T  ¬D+{	∈wi};
(4) wi |=¬	 is not tableau deducible from D and T.
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Proof. (1)⇔ (2): This was part of the original Testing Lemma (Lemma 3.5).
(2)⇒ (3): By the soundness of tableau provability (see Section IV.4 of [10]).
(4)⇒ (1): This follows the proof of completeness of tableau provability, as we
sketched at the end of the previous section. Assume wi |=¬	 is not tableau deducible
from D and T . Then the complete systematic tableau (CST) from D and T with root
Fwi |=¬	 contains a noncontradictory path. This noncontradictory path yields a Kripke
model. By de4nition of the CST, it is a model of T . Since Fwi |=¬	 and the entries
from D are on the path, the model witnesses D + {	∈wi}.
(3)⇒ (4): We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that wi |=¬	 is tableau deducible
from D and T . Then there is a contradictory tableau % with root Fwi |=¬	 and the
entries from D on the stem. We will show that T ¬D+{	∈wi}, by constructing a
tableau %′ which “mimics” the tableau proof %.
The root of %′ is of course Fw0 |=¬D+{	∈wi}. As it is child we put Tw0 |=
D+{	∈wi}. Next we “unwind” the representing formula D+{	∈wi}, using the tableau
development rules. This will produce the entries from D+ {	∈wi} on the stem of %′.
From that point on we can mimic %.
More precisely, suppose D′ = D + {	∈wi}=(W;R). We use induction on the tree
structure of (W;R) to construct %′ so that for each wk ∈W
•  ∈wk ⇒Twk |=  is on the stem of %;
• (wj; wk)∈R⇒wjRwk is on the stem of %;
• (wk; wl)∈R⇒Twk |= l is on the stem of %.
The 4rst two clauses will establish that the entries from D′ are on the stem of %′. The
entries Twk |= l of the last clause also appear on the stem as we unwind D′ , and
will be useful as part of the induction hypothesis.
Our induction works from the root node w0 of D′ out to the leaves. For the base
case, recall that 0 =D
′
=
∧
({ |  ∈w0}∪ {l | (w0; wl)∈R}). So beginning with
Tw0 |=D′ , repeated applications of (T∧) yield the entries Tw0 |=  for each  ∈w0
and Tw0 |= l for each wl ∈W such that (w0; wl)∈R. Since w0 is the root, there is
no wj such that (wj; w0)∈R. Thus, we have established the base case.
For the induction step, take wk ∈W with parent wj, i.e., (wj; wk)∈R. By the in-
duction hypothesis, Twj |=  k is on the stem. So by applying the (T) tableau
development rule, we add entries wjRwk and Twk |=k to the stem (here we choose
wk as the name of the new world in this application of the (T) rule). Now, as in
the base case, repeated applications of (T∧) on Twk |= k yield the entries Twk |=  
for each  ∈ wk and Twk |= l for each wl such that (wk; wl)∈R. This is depicted
in Fig. 6.
Thus, from unwinding Tw0 |=D′ as described, we get a set of entries on the stem
of %′. Let us call this set of entries (. We have shown that ( contains the entries from
D′=D + {	∈wi} (plus other entries that arise from unwinding D′).
Now that we have all the entries from D′=D+{	∈wi} on the stem, we de4ne the
rest of %′ by copying the development of % below the entries from D on its stem. In
particular, we may assume % has structure shown in Fig. 7, for some tree of entries ).
We now show that how to continue to produce %′ so that it has the structure shown
in Fig. 8, where ) is the subtree of %.
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Fig. 6. Unwinding 
k .
Fig. 7. Tableau proof %.
Fig. 8. Tableau deduction %′.
We can prove this by a simple induction. Any entry E on ) appears from developing
either
(1) the root Fwi |=¬	;
(2) an entry E′ from D, or;
(3) a previous entry E′ on ).
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Fig. 9. The path P.
Case (1): the entry E must be Twi |=	. But this entry is already on (, since it is
an entry from D′=D + {	∈wi}, so we can repeat it.
Case (2): we have already established that the entries from D are on (, so we can
develop E′ as needed to produce E on %′.
Case (3): by induction E′ is on %′, so we can develop it to produce E on %′.
Finally, we prove that %′ is contradictory. Take a path P′ through %′. Consider the
corresponding path P through %, as shown in Fig. 9.
Since % is contradictory, there are entries Tw |=  and Fw |=  on P. We know the
entries from D lie on the stem of %′. So if the contradictory entries lie on D→P′ ∩ )
they also lie on P′.
The only remaining case is if the contradiction on P is caused by the root, i.e.,
P is contradictory because of entries Fwi |=¬	 and Twi |=¬	. Then Twi |=¬	 is on
D→P′ ∩ ), so it also on P′. By developing it, we can assume Fwi |=	 is on P′.
Now recall that Twi |=	 is also on P′, since it is an entry from D′. Hence, P′ is
contradictory, as desired.
4.5. The testing lemma and the deduction theorem
Finally, we compare the modal Testing Lemma we have just proved with the clas-
sical Deduction Theorem. We will see how the Testing Lemma can be viewed as a
translation of the Deduction Theorem into modal logic.
For convenience, we repeat the two results:
Theorem 4.5 (Classical deduction theorem). For a theory T , a ;nite set of sentences

, and a sentence 	 (all in a classical ;rst-order language L), the following are
equivalent:
(1) T ∪
 |=¬	;
(2) T |=¬(
 ∧ 	);
(3) T  ¬(
 ∧ 	);
(4) T ∪
  ¬	.
Lemma 4.6 (Modal testing lemma). For a theory T , a tree FKD D, and a sentence
	 (all in modal language L), the following are equivalent:
(1) D + {	∈wi} is T -consistent, i.e., there exists a Kripke model of T witnessing
D + {	∈wi};
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(2) T |=¬D+{	∈wi};
(3) T  ¬D+{	∈wi};
(4) wi |=¬	 is not tableau deducible from D and T.
We usually think that the Deduction Theorem fails for modal logic, because we
think that the 4nite set of classical sentences 
 must translate to a 4nite set of modal
sentences. Here, we choose to view 
 as the 4nite diagram of a classical model. Its
counterpart in modal logic is a FKD D, which adds the extra structure of possible
worlds and a possibility relation.
With that view, both clauses (1) state the condition that needs to be checked in a
Henkin-style construction of a model of a theory T : that there is a model of T which
witnesses a particular extended diagram. As we explained earlier, clause (1) of the
classical Deduction Theorem says that there is a model of T witnessing 
∪{	}. Thus,
in the classical case, the 4nite diagram 
 is extended by adding 	, to get 
∪{	}. In
the modal case, the 4nite diagram D is extended by adding 	 at a particular existing
world wi, to get D + {	∈wi}.
Thus, the modal Testing Lemma has the same use as the classical Deduction The-
orem: both are used in the construction of a model to determine whether there is
a witnessing model of an extended 4nite diagram, and thus if the diagram can be
extended as such.
Initially it may have appeared that the Testing Lemma and the Deduction Theorem
carry out this similar function in rather di#erent ways. But by rephrasing the Deduction
Theorem as we have, we can see further parallels.
Instead of viewing the Deduction Theorem as being about the implication 
→¬	,
we view it as a statement about conjunction; namely, the conjunction 
 ∧ 	, which
represents the extended 4nite diagram 
∪{	} syntactically. In the modal context, the
representing formula of a FKD cannot be simply a conjuction, since it must represent
the possibility relation of the FKD. The representing formula D+{	∈wi} does this by
nesting conjunctions within  modalities.
Then clauses (2) of both theorems state that the negation of the representing for-
mula of the extended diagram is not a logical consequence of the theory T , i.e., that
the representing formula is satis4able. Similarly both clauses (3) state that this same
negation is not provable from the theory T .
Finally, clause (4) is in both cases a proof-theoretic version of clause (1). In the
classical case, it states that ¬	 is not deducible from the theory T and the 4nite diagram

. Similarly, in the modal case it states that wi |=¬	 is not (tableau) deducible from
T and the FKD D.
We have argued that the Testing Lemma that we have proved for tree FKDs should
be viewed as an analogue of the classical Deduction Theorem for modal logic. We
began by noting the functional similarity between the two: the Testing Lemma is used
in our e#ective construction of a Kripke model in the same way that the classical
Deduction Theorem is used in the e#ective construction of a classical model. Then,
after rephrasing the classical Deduction Theorem and introducing the notion of tableau
deductions from a FKD, we demonstrated a strong formal similarity between the two
theorems as well.
S. Ganguli, A. Nerode / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 128 (2004) 141–195 171
We have proved the Testing Lemma for a particular modal logic: 4rst-order con-
stant domain K. But because it uses very basic aspects of Kripke models and the 
modality, the Testing Lemma carries over to a number of other modal logics. In the
following Sections, we will use tree FKDs and Testing Lemmas to carry out e#ective
constructions of Kripke models for these modal logics as well.
5. Special possibility relations
In Section 3, we proved an E#ective Completeness Theorem for a particular modal
logic. To e#ectively construct a Kripke model, we proved a Testing Lemma, and
subsequently argued in Section 4 that this result can be viewed as the analogue of the
classical Deduction Theorem for (this) modal logic.
In this section and the following one, we examine some common modal logics which
are very similar to the one we have been working with. They contain the same and
 modalities as before; but they formalize di#erent interpretations of these modalities,
through the following mechanisms:
• special types of possibility relations in the Kripke models;
• certain axiom schema, in axiomatic proof systems;
• certain tableau rules, in tableau proof systems.
We will show that for these logics, we can adapt the tools and techniques we have
developed in Sections 2 and 3 just slight modi4cations.
5.1. The logics
The modal logic we have been working with up to this point, as de4ned in Sec-
tion 2.2, is usually referred to as K. Formally, we can view K as either
• the set of valid sentences (the sentences true in every world of every Kripke model);
• the set of tableau provable sentences (the sentences 	 such that there is a contra-
dictory tableau with root Fw |=	).
By the Completeness Theorem for tableau proofs, these two sets coincide.
As we mentioned in Section 4, axiomatic treatments of modal logics preceeded both
possible worlds semantics and tableau proof systems. So the original de4nition of K
was actually as the following axiomatic system:
• axiom schema from an axiomatic system for classical predicate logic;
• axiom scheme: (	→  )→ ( 	→  );
• rule of inference (modus ponens) : from 	 and 	→  infer  ;
• rule of inference (generalization) : from 	 infer 	.
The set of theorems of this axiomatic system coincides with the de4nition of K in
terms of tableau provability and valid sentences (see [8] for a proof of this fact).
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K is often viewed as a starting point, which can be extended by adding var-
ious axiom schema. Some common axiom schema, with their traditional names,
are:
• T : 	→	;
• 4 : 	→ 	;
• 5 : ¬ 	→ ¬ 	.
The following axiomatic systems de4ne some common modal logics:
• T consists of K and the axiom scheme T ;
• S4 consists of T and the axiom scheme 4 (i.e., K and the axiom schema T and 4);
• K4 consists of K and the axiom scheme 4;
• K5 consists of K4 and the axiom scheme 5 (i.e., K and the axiom schema
4 and 5);
• S5 consists of S4 and the axiom schema 5 (i.e., K and the axiom schema T , 4,
and 5).
For the rest of this section, we will let L stand for any of these six logics: K, T, K4,
S4, K5 or S5.
Subsequent to the de4nition of these logics as axiomatic systems, it was discovered
that they have very natural characterizations, both in terms of the possible worlds
semantics and in terms of tableau provability. The set of theorems of each axiomatic
system above coincides with the set of formulas valid with respect to a natural class
of Kripke models, and also with the set of sentences provable using a certain set of
tableau rules. In each case, we call the corresponding class of models the L-models,
and the corresponding set of tableau rules the L-rules.
Denition 5.1. (1) A Kripke model M =(W;R;D; I) is a (T, K4, S4, K5, S5)-
model i# the possibility relation R is (reAexive, transitive, reAexive and transitive,
transitive and Euclidean, an equivalence relation).
(2) The (T;K4;S4;K5;S5)-rules consist of the basic tableau rules plus the (reAexive,
transitive, reAexive and transitive, transitive and Euclidean, complete) tableau develop-
ment rule(s). (See Section IV.5 of [10] for the de4nitions of these tableau development
rules.)
In addition, we say every Kripke model is a K-model, and we let the K-rules refer
to just the basic tableau rules.
With this notation in place, we say a sentence 	 is
• valid with respect to the L-models (notation: |=L 	) if M |=	 for every L-model
M ;
• tableau provable using the L-rules (notation: L 	) if there is a contradictory
tableau generated using the L-rules with root Fw |=	.
This notation is justi4ed by the following result.
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Theorem 5.2. For each logic L,
L = {	 | |=L 	} = {	 | L 	}:
Proof. See Section IV.5 of [10].
For example, the logic T coincides with the set of sentences valid with respect to
reAexive Kripke frames. It also coincides with the set of sentences for which there are
tableau proofs using the basic tableau rules plus the reAexive tableau development rule.
To state an e#ective completeness theorem for each logic L, we need to extend
these notions of validity and provability to include a set of (global) premises T . We
can then formulate the concept of a theory with respect to L.
Denition 5.3. For any set of sentences T and each logic L,
• T |=L 	 ⇔ if M is a L-model of T , then M |=	;
• T L 	 ⇔ 	 is tableau provable from T using L-rules.
The Completeness Theorem(s) connect these notions:
Theorem 5.4. T |=L 	 ⇔ T L 	.
Proof. Again, see [10].
Denition 5.5. A set of sentences T is an L-theory i# it is closed with respect to
|=L (or equivalently, L).
5.2. Testing lemmas
We wish to generalize the techniques developed for K in Section 3 to each logic L.
Then, given a decidable L-theory T which has an L-model, we will be able to show
that T has a decidable L-model, thus proving an E#ective Completeness Theorem
for L.
As in Construction 3.6, we will construct a decidable model by building a sequence
of FKDs. We will satisfy the completeness requirements at each existing world in
stages, and create new worlds as “-witnessses.” To satisfy the completess requirements,
we would like to use the representing formula of a FKD, as in De4nition 3.4.
It appears that we run into a problem here. For example, suppose that we are trying
to build a T-model for a decidable T-theory. Then we need the possibility relation in
the model to be reAexive. An obvious way to do this would be to make the possibility
relations in the FKDs. But this would violate the tree structure of the FKDs, which
is essential to de4ning the representing formulas. Recall that the representing formula
D of a FKD D is de4ned by induction on the tree structure of D, with the base case
as the leaves. But there are no such leaves if the possibility relation of D is reAexive;
every world has at least one successor, namely itself.
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For example, take a FKD D=(W = {w0}; R= {(w0; w0)}). Then, according to our
De4nition 3.4, the representing formula should be
D = 0 =
∧
({	 |	 ∈ w0} ∪ {j | (w0; wj) ∈ R}) = ∧({	 |	 ∈ w0} ∪ 0
so D is not well-de4ned.
We will avoid these problems by working only with tree FKDs as before, so that
we can safely de4ne the representing formulas. But now we will use those representing
formulas to build FKDs which are consistent with respect to the class of L-models,
i.e., that have witnessing L-models. To do so, we use a version of the Testing Lemma
adapted to L.
Lemma 5.6 (Testing lemma for L). Fix a modal language L. For a theory T , a tree
FKD D, and a sentence 	 (all in the language L), the following are equivalent:
(1) D+ {	∈wi} is T -consistent with respect to the class of L-models, i.e., there is
an L-model witnessing D + {	∈wi};
(2) T |=L ¬D+{	∈wi};
(3) T L ¬D+{	∈wi};
(4) wi |=¬	 is not tableau deducible from D and T using L-rules.
Proof. The proof is almost exactly like the proof we gave of the original Testing
Lemma, i.e., for the logic K (see the proofs of Lemmas 3.5 and 4.4.).
(1)⇒ (2): In the proof of Lemma 3.5, we showed that if M is a model of T
which witnesses D + {	∈wi} via f, then (M;f(w0)) |=D+{	∈wi}, and hence T |=
¬D+{	∈wi}. Here, the witnessing model M is an L-model by assumption, and so
we conclude that T |=L ¬D+{	∈wi}.
(2)⇒ (3): By the soundness of tableau provability using L-rules with respect to
L-models.
(3)⇒ (4): As in the proof of Lemma 4.4, prove the contrapositive. From a contra-
dictory tableau from D and T with root Fwi |=¬	 using L-rules, construct a tableau
proof of ¬D+{	∈wi} from T , also using L-rules.
(4)⇒ (1): For the proof of Lemma 4.4, we showed that if wi |=¬	 is not tableau
deducible from D and T , then a noncontradictory path through the CST from D and
T with root Fwi |=¬	 yields a countermodel of T which witnesses D + {	 ∈ wi}.
Now suppose that wi |=¬	 is not tableau deducible from D and T using the L-rules.
Then the CST using the L-rules has a noncontradictory path, which yields a model
of T witnessing D + {	∈wi}. Since the CST was generated using the L-rules, the
resulting model is a L-model (just as in the proof of the Completeness Theorem for
L; see [10]). Thus, we have a L-model which witnesses D + {	∈wi}.
We will use this Testing Lemma to e#ectively construct a sequence of tree FKDs
which are T -consistent with respect to the class of L-models. From this sequence we
will de4ne a decidable L-model for the given decidable L-theory T , thus proving an
E#ective Completeness Theorem for L.
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But how do we get from tree FKDs to an L-model, in which the possibility
relation is reAexive/transitive/: : :? For instance, how does using the Testing Lemma
for K4 to de4ne tree FKDs lead us to a Kripke model with a transitive possibil-
ity relation, even though the possibility relations of the tree FKDs are not
transitive?
The simple answer is that to de4ne the model from the tree FKDs, we will “close
o#” the possibility relation, so as to construct a (reAexive/transitive/: : :) model. Why
does this work? In particular, why will the Truth Lemma still go through for this
(reAexive/transitive/: : :) model?
One view is that although the tree FKDs do not explicitly have the properties
corresponding to L (i.e., reAexive for T, transitive for K4, etc.), we may think
that using the Testing Lemma for L implies that the possibility relation of the tree
FKDs “implicitly” have the corresponding property. We can explain this in two dif-
ferent ways, semantically and syntactically, according to two clauses of the Testing
Lemma:
• semantically: using clause (1) of the Testing Lemma for L, we will de4ne the FKDs
Dn so that each Dn has a witnessing L-model. When we look within the class
of L-models for witnessing models, the possibility relation of Dn is “converted”
into a possibility relations in the witnessing model which has the special property
corresponding to L.
For example, suppose we are carrying out a construction of a decidable K4-model,
and we have a FKD D where
w→w′→w′′:
Since we use the Testing Lemma for K4, we look for a K4-model which wit-
nesses D. Suppose M =(WM; RM ; : : :) is such a K4-model which witnesses D via f.
Then (f(w); f(w′)); (f(w′); f(w′′))∈RM , since (w; w′); (w′; w′′)∈RD. Since M is a
K4-model, RM is transitive, so (f(w); f(w′′))∈RM as well.
Thus, the “missing” edge from w to w′′ in D, which we would expect to be there if
we are going to use D to construct a K4-model, is in any K4-model which witnesses
D. We describe this situation by saying that using the Testing Lemma for K4 on D
means the edge is there implicitly.
• syntactically: using clause (4) of the Testing Lemma for L, we will de4ne the
FKDs Dn so that there is no contradictory tableau from Dn using the L-rules. But
the L-rules mean that the possibility relation R of a FKD D is again “converted”
into a possibility relation with the special property corresponding to L.
Taking the same example as above, any tableau from D using the K4-rules will
have the entries wRw′ and w′Rw′′ on its stem. Then the K4-rules means wRw′′ can be
added to any branch of the tableau. Thus, the “missing” edge from w to w′′ is put in
by the tableau rules, and can be used in any attempt to derive a contradictory tableau
from D.
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5.3. The construction
Now that we have a Testing Lemma for L, we can use it to construct a decidable
L-model for a given decidable L-theory. The construction is essentially the same as
Construction 3.6. We will construct a sequence of tree FKDs Dn, by satisfying com-
pleteness requirements at existing worlds and creating new worlds as -witnesses. But
now when we attempt to test the consistency of an extended diagram Dn + {	e ∈wni },
we will check the satis4ability of the representing formula D with respect to the
class of L-models. This will ensure that each tree FKD Dn we build has a witnessing
L-model. This will let us de4ne a decidable L-model from the sequence of tree
FKDs.
Construction 5.7. Given a decidable L-theory T which has a L-model, the construc-
tion will produce a L-model M .
Fix a computable set of new constants C, an e#ective enumeration 	0; 	1; : : : of the
sentences in the extended language L∪C, and  : N→N×N as in Construction 3.6.
Stage −1: D0 = ({w00 = ∅}; R0 = ∅):
Stage n: By induction, we have a FKD Dn =(Wn = {wn0 ; : : : ; wnp}; Rn). Suppose  (n)
= (i; e). If i¿p, simply put Dn+1 =Dn, update indices from n to n+ 1, and go on to
stage n+ 1.
If i6p, then we shall satisfy the eth completeness requirement at wi. Let D=D +
{	e ∈wni }. Using the decidability of T , e#ectively check whether T |=L ¬D. Proceed
as in the analogous step of Construction 3.6.
Now we will de4ne a Kripke model M from the sequence of FKDs Dn. The possible
worlds and the interpretation of the model are de4ned from the Dn exactly as in
Construction 3.6. The only di#erence is in de4ning the possibility relation.
Before, we just accumulated the possibility relations of the Dn. But now (for L
other than K), since we have only constructed tree FKDs, accumulating the possibility
relations Rn of the FKDs will not produce a L-model. Hence, to produce a L-model,
we “close o#” the Rn so that the possibility relation of M has the desired property.
For each i such that wni occurs in some Dn, let
wi =
∞⋃
n=0
wni :
Now de4ne M =(W;RM ;D; I) as follows:
• the set of possible worlds is W = {wi : wni occurs in some Dn};
• the domain D of the model is the set of new constants C;
• the interpretation I is de4ned from the syntactic contents of the wi: for each n-place
relation symbol P, n-tuple Nc of elements of C, and possible world wi,
Nc ∈ I(wi)(P) ⇔ P( Nc) ∈ wi;
S. Ganguli, A. Nerode / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 128 (2004) 141–195 177
• to de4ne the possibility relation RM , 4rst let R be the accumulation of the Rn:
(wi; wj) ∈ R ⇔ (wni ; wnj ) ∈ Rn for some n;
Now to produce an L-model, we de4ne RM by “closing o#” R in the appropriate
way. In the case that L is
◦ K, let RM =R. (This is simply Construction 3.6.)
◦ T, let RM be the reAexive closure of R.
◦ K4, let RM be the transitive closure of R.
◦ S4, let RM be the reAexive and transitive closure of R.
◦ K5, let RM be the transitive and Euclidean closure of R.
◦ S5, let RM be the complete closure of R.
Notice that we checked whether T |=L ¬D within the construction. Hence, the Dn
are constructed based on criteria which maintain T -consistency with respect to the class
of L-models.
Lemma 5.8 (Consistency Lemma). Each FKD Dn is T -consistent with respect to the
class of L-models.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of the original Consistency Lemma
(Lemma 3.7). Basically, we “relativize” that proof to the class of L-models. By in-
duction on n:
Base case: D0 is T -consistent with respect to the class of L-models since T has an
L-model by hypothesis.
Induction step: Assume Dn is T -consistent with respect to the class of L-models.
To show that Dn+1 is T -consistent with respect to the class of L-models, consider
how Dn is extended to Dn+1 at stage n:
(1) In the case that T |=L ¬D, no L-model of T witnesses D (by the Testing
Lemma for L). But since Dn is T -consistent with respect to to the class of
L-models, some L-model M of T witnesses Dn via f. Then it must be that
(M;f(win)) |=¬	e, so M also witnesses Dn+1 with respect to to the class of L-
models.
(2) In the case that T |=L ¬D, there is an L-model M of T which witnesses D. So
in particular (M;f(wni )) |=	e. As before M witnesses Dn+1 with respect to to the
class of L-models.
Using this Consistency Lemma, we prove a Closure Lemma and a Truth Lemma, as
in Sections 3.6 and 3.7.
Lemma 5.9 (Closure Lemma). The following are true for each wi ∈W :
(1) for each sentence 	 in the extended language L∪C, exactly one of 	 or ¬	 is
in wi;
(2) (	 ∧  )∈wi⇔	∈wi and  ∈wi;
(3) ∃ x (x)∈wi ⇔ there exists c∈C such that  (c)∈wi;
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(4)  ∈wi ⇔ there exists wj ∈W such that (wi; wj)∈RM and  ∈wj;
(5)  ∈wi ⇔  ∈wj for every wj ∈W such that (wi; wj)∈RM ;
(6) T ⊆ wi.
Proof. The proof follows from the Consistency Lemma: for each of the clauses except
(4) and (5), the proof is exactly the same as for the original Consistency Lemma
(Lemma 3.7).
The forward direction of (4) is also the same as before: if  ∈wni , then we created
a -witness wnj such that (wni ; wnj )∈Rn and  ∈wnj . Then (wi; wj)∈R⊆RM and  ∈wj.
For the backward direction of (4), we must take into account that we have de4ned
RM by “closing o#” R. So suppose (wi; wj)∈RM and  ∈wj but  =∈wi; then ¬  ∈
wi. Find n such that wni and w
n
j exist in Dn,  ∈wnj , and ¬   ∈wni .
Note that we cannot assume that (wni ; w
n
j )∈Rn. It may be that (wi; wj) =∈R but
(wi; wj) =∈RM because it is in the (reAexive/transitive/: : :) closure of R (in the case
that L=T=K4= : : :). But it is true that (wni ; w
n
j ) is in the (reAexive/: : :) closure of
Rn. Then there cannot be an L-model M =(WM; RM ; : : :) which witnesses such a
Dn, which contradicts the fact that each Dn is T -consistent with respect to the class of
L-models. Hence, (wi; wj)∈RM and  ∈wj implies  ∈wi.
The proof of clause (5) uses the same reasoning, so we omit the details.
The Truth Lemma follows from the Consistency Lemma, as before.
Lemma 5.10 (Truth Lemma). For each wi ∈W and each sentence 	 of L∪C,
(M;wi) |= 	 ⇔ 	 ∈ wi:
Theorem 5.11. Every decidable L-theory in a modal language L has a decidable
L-model.
Proof. For a given decidable L-theory T , take the Kripke model M produced by
Construction 5.7.
That truth is decidable in M (i.e., that the set {(w; 	) : (M;w) |=	} is computable)
follows from the Truth Lemma and the Construction above, in the same way as in the
proof of Theorem 3.11.
We show that RM is decidable. Recall that in the Construction R is the accumulation
of the Rn, which we “closed o#” to de4ne RM . In the case that L is
• K: this was the case covered in Theorem 3.11, where we showed R=RM is decid-
able.
• T: since RM is the reAexive closure of R, this follows easily from the fact that R is
decidable; given wi; wj ∈W , (wi; wj)∈RM i# (wi; wj)∈R or wi =wj.
• K4: recall that RM is the transitive closure of R. Given wi; wj ∈W , determine whether
(wi; wj)∈RM as follows: search for a stage n of the construction in which both wni
and wnj exist (in the FKD Dn =(Wn; Rn)). Then (wi; wj)∈RM i# wnj is reachable from
wni via Rn. The latter condition is clearly decidable since (Wn; Rn) is a 4nite graph.
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• S4: since RM is the reAexive and transitive closure of R, this follows from the
previous two cases.
• K5: Recall that RM is the transitive and Euclidean closure of R. We claim that
for every wi; wj ∈W , (wi; wj)∈RM unless wj =w0; then RM is certainly decidable.
Suppose wj =w0. If wi =w0, then clearly (wi; wj)∈RM , since there is an R-path from
w0 to every other element of W and RM is the transitive closure of R.
By the same reasoning, if wi =w0 then (w0; wi)∈RM and (w0; wj)∈RM . Then
(wi; wj)∈RM since RM is Euclidean.
• S5: since RM be the complete closure of R, this is trivial: (wi; wj)∈RM for every
wi; wj ∈W .
6. Domain assumptions
In this section we focus on the domains of the Kripke models we construct. Ac-
cording to De4nition 2.4, a Kripke model M =(W;R;D; I) has a domain D. Each of
the constructions of decidable Kripke models presented thus far started with a set of
new constants C, which eventually became the domain of the model.
This is the simplest and most basic type of domain assumption for Kripke models.
These models are usually called constant domain Kripke models. Recall that we can
view a Kripke model as a collection of classical models, one associated with each
possible world w∈W . According to our de4nition of a Kripke model, each of these
classical models has the same domain. We will now study Kripke models in which
this is not necessarily the case. Instead of being a 4xed set of elements, D will now
be a domain function which associates with each w∈W a set of elements D(w). We
will refer to D(w) as the domain of the possible world w.
Thus, in constant domain Kripke models the domain function is a constant function,
which assigns the same domain to each possible world. We will consider two di#erent
types of Kripke models in which D(w) can vary for di#erent w∈W . In one, there is
no restriction whatsoever on the domain function D; the domains may vary freely. In
such models, the interpretation I must interpret the atomic relation symbols at each
world w over all the domains of all the worlds.
This is a somewhat counterintuitive de4nition of the interpretation I . It is perhaps
more natural to expect I to interpret the atomic relations at each world w only over
the domain of w. For this to make sense, however, we must require that the domains
be monotonically increasing in the possibility relation R.
We call these two types of models varying domain Kripke models and monotonic
domain Kripke models, respectively. We will adapt our construction to produce a
decidable model of each type.
6.1. Monotonic and varying domain Kripke models
We begin with the de4nitions monotonic and varying domain Kripke models, formal-
izing the discussion above and generalizing our original de4nition of a Kripke model
(De4nition 2.4).
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Denition 6.1. A Kripke model is a tuple M =(W;R;D; I) where W is a set of possible
worlds, R is a binary possibility relation on W , and D is a domain function which
assigns to each w∈W a set D(w). Moreover, M is a
(1) constant domain Kripke model if there is a set D such that D(w)=D for all
w∈W ; I(w)(P)⊆Dn for each n-place relation symbol P; and I(c)∈D for each
constant symbol c.
(2) varying domain Kripke model if I(w)(P)⊆ (⋃w∈W D(w))n for each n-place rela-
tion symbol P, and I(c)∈ ⋃w∈W D(w) for each constant symbol c.
(3) monotonic domain Kripke model if I(w)(P)⊆D(w)n for each n-place relation
symbol P; I(w)(c)∈D(w) for each constant symbol c; and (w; w′)∈R implies
D(w)⊆D(w′) and I(w)(c)= I(w′)(c) for each constant symbol c.
As before, we will work with models that have constants which name each of the
elements in the model. We described how to do this for constant domain models in
Section 2.2. Similarly, for a varying domain model M we expand L to LM by adding
a constant symbol ca for each a∈
⋃
w∈W D(w), and put I(ca)= a for each such a.
For monotonic domain models the situation is slightly di#erent. For a monotonic
domain model M , we obtain an expanded language L(w) for each possible world w of
M by adding a constant symbol ca for each element a∈D(w). Then we expand M by
putting I(w)(ca)= a for each a∈D(w). Note that this expansion satis4es the condition
that I(w)(ca)= I(w′)(ca) in the case (w; w′)∈R, for each a∈D(w)⊆D(w′).
We now give the de4nition of truth for each kind of domain assumption. The key
clauses in these de4nitions are the quanti4er clauses. They reAect the idea that, at a
given possible world w∈W , the quanti4ers quantify over D(w).
Denition 6.2 (Truth in monotonic domain models). We give the conditions under
which a sentence 	 of L(w) is true in a monotonic domain model M =(W;R;D; I)
at a possible world w∈W (notation: (M;w) |=	):
(1) (M;w) |=P(c0; : : : ; cn) i# (I(w)(c0); : : : ; I(w)(cn))∈ I(w)(P)
(where c0; : : : ; cn are constants in L(w));
(2) (M;w) |=	∧  i# (M;w) |=	 and (M;w) |=  ;
(3) (M;w) |=¬	 i# (M;w) |=	;
(4) (M;w) |=∃x	(x) i# (M;w) |=	(c) for some constant c in L(w);
(5) (M;w) |=	 i# (M;w′) |=	 for some w′ such that (w; w′)∈R;
(6) (M;w) |= 	 i# (M;w′) |=	 for every w′ such that (w; w′)∈R.
Note that the constants in L(w) name exactly the elements of D(w). Thus, the clause
for ∃x	(x) reAects the idea that the existential quanti4er quanti4es over D(w).
For de4nition of truth in a varying domain model, we need to alter the clauses for
the atomic sentences and for the quanti4ers.
Denition 6.3 (Truth in varying domain models). We give the conditions under which
a sentence of LM is true is true in a varying domain model M =(W;R;D; I) at a possible
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world w∈W :
(1) (M;w) |=P(c0; : : : ; cn) i# (I(c0); : : : ; I(cn))∈ I(w)(P) (where c0; : : : ; cn are constants
in LM );
(2) same as above;
(3) same as above;
(4) (M;w) |=∃x	(x) i# (M;w) |=	(ca) for some a∈D(w);
(5) same as above;
(6) same as above.
We introduce consequence relations relativized to each class of models. For a set of
sentences T and a sentence 	 in a modal language L:
• T |=VD 	 i# every varying domain model which is a model of T is also a model
of 	.
• T |=MD 	 i# every monotonic domain model which is a model of T is also a model
of 	.
Finally, a set of sentences T is a varying domain (monotonic domain) theory if it
is closed with respect to |=VD (|=MD).
We also generalize the notion of a decidable Kripke model to the varying domain
and monotonic domain cases.
Denition 6.4. A varying domain (monotonic domain) Kripke model M =(W;R;D; I)
for the language L is decidable if the sets W , D(w) (for each w∈W ), the relation R
and the relation
{(w; 	) : (M;w) |= 	}
is computable, where 	 ranges over the sentences of LM (L(w)).
6.2. Varying domains
In our construction of a decidable constant domain model (Construction 3.6), we
worked over a single in4nite set of new constants C, which became the domain of the
model. For both of the new constructions in the following sections—of a decidable
varying domain model and of a decidable monotonic domain model—we will need an
in4nite collection of such sets {Ci : i∈!}, which are pairwise disjoint.
Both constructions will proceed in much the same manner as the previous ones.
We will build a sequence of tree FKDs. At each stage we will satisfy a completeness
requirement with respect to some sentence 	 at some existing possible world wi.
Moreover, Ci will be associated with the possible world wi in both constructions.
In the varying domain construction, we will put Ci as the domain of wi. Which
sentences is it necessary to decide at wi over the course of the construction? For
a varying domain model M =(W;R;Dom; I), the interpretation I(wi)(P) of an n-
place relation symbol P at a possible world wi ∈W is a subset of (
⋃
w∈W Dom(w))
n.
Hence, we must decide atomic sentences P( Nc) for every tuple Nc from (
⋃
i∈! Ci)
n,
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and so we must decide all the sentences from L∪C0 ∪C1 ∪C2 ∪ · · · at
each wi.
We will accomplish this in the construction by satisfying completeness requirements
with respect to the sentences of L∪C0 ∪C1 ∪ · · · ∪Cn once wn has been created. Thus,
we are led to the following de4nition.
Denition 6.5. A varying domain FKD D=(WD = {w0; : : : ; wn}; RD) is a FKD such
that each 	∈wi is a sentence of L∪C0 ∪C1 ∪ · · · ∪Cn.
A witnessing model for a varying domain FKD D should be a varying domain model
which, in addition to preserving the truth of sentences and the possibility relation of
D, has elements corresponding to the constants from the Ci which occur in the FKD.
Moreover, those elements must occur in the right domains in the witnessing model.
Denition 6.6. A varying domain Kripke model M =(WM; RM ;Dom; I) witnesses a
varying domain FKD D=(WD; RD) via f if M is a model for the language L∪C0 ∪C1
∪ · · · ∪Cn and f : WD→WM is a function such that
• if (wi; wj)∈RD, then (f(wi); f(wj))∈RM ;
• for each constant symbol c∈Ci which occurs in D, I(c)∈Dom(f(wi));
• if 	∈wi, then (M;f(wi)) |=	.
As usual, we say a varying domain FKD D is T -consistent if there exists a varying
domain model of T which witnesses D.
As before, wi in the FKD corresponds to f(wi) in the witnessing model. Since we
plan to make Ci the domain of wi in the varying domain model we are constructing,
each c∈Ci that is mentioned in the given FKD should name an element that lives in
Dom(f(wi)). Hence, we require that I(c)∈Dom(f(wi)) for such c∈Ci.
We can now see why we restricted the sentences in a FKD D=(W = {w0; : : : ; wn}; R)
to be from L∪C0 ∪C1 ∪ · · · ∪Cn. If i¿n, we would have no way of guaranteeing
through our de4nition that a witnessing model has an element corresponding to c∈Ci
which lives in the right place. (The right place would be Dom(f(wi)), but because
i¿n, wi does not exist in D.)
Next we de4ne a representing formula for a varying domain FKD. It will look
very much like the de4nition above for the constant domain case (De4nition 3.4). But
now the representing formula must syntactically represent the notion that each c∈Ci
names an element in the possible world corresponding to wi. We will use existential
quanti4ers to express the existence of such elements. We will also use equality. Hence,
we assume that each modal language L has a two-place relation symbol “=” which
we use to represent equality. We want to consider Kripke models for the language L
in which the interpretation of = is true equality. 5
Denition 6.7. A Kripke model M =(W;R;D; I) is an equality model if I(w)(=) is
the equality relation for each w∈W .
5 Consult Chapter 7 of [4] for further details on equality in modal logic.
S. Ganguli, A. Nerode / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 128 (2004) 141–195 183
Note that this de4nition applies to all three types of Kripke models: constant domain,
varying domain, and monotonic domain. In constant domain equality models, I(w)(=)
is the equality relation on D; in varying domain models, on (
⋃
w∈W D(w)); and in
monotonic domain models, on D(w). We will need it only for the varying domain
case.
6.3. The representing formula
Now we can de4ne a representing formula for a varying domain tree FKD.
Denition 6.8. Suppose D=(W = {w0; : : : ; wn}; R) is a varying domain tree FKD with
root node w0. We associate with each node wi ∈W a formula i, de4ned by induction.
In both clauses below, Nci =(ci0; : : : ; cim) denotes the tuple of all constants from Ci
occurring in D; Nxi =(xi0; : : : ; xim) is a corresponding tuple of fresh variables; and Nxi = Nci
denotes the conjunction xi0 = ci0 ∧ · · · ∧ xim = cim.
• If wi is a leaf, then i =∃ Nxi( Nxi = Nci)∧ (
∧{	 |	∈wi}).
• If wi is a not a leaf, then
i = ∃ Nxi( Nxi = Nci) ∧
(∧
{	 |	 ∈ wi}
)
∧ (
∧
{j | (wi; wj) ∈ R}):
Finally, let D =0, the formula associated with the root node.
Lemma 6.9 (Varying domain testing lemma). For a varying domain FKD D=(WD;
RD) and a theory T , the following are equivalent:
(1) D+ {	∈wi} is T -consistent, i.e., there exists an varying domain equality model
of T witnessing D + {	∈wi};
(2) T |=VD ¬D+{	∈wi}.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of the original Testing Lemma (Lemma
3.5). We simply adapt the ideas of that proof to the context of varying domains.
• (1)⇒ (2): Suppose M =(WM; RM ;Dom; I) is a varying domain equality model of
T which witnesses D + {	∈wi}. As in the proof of Lemma 3.5, we prove by
induction that (M;f(wi)) |=i for each wi ∈WD. Then (M;f(w0)) |=0, showing
that T |=VD ¬D+{	∈wi}.
The only di#erence from the original case is that now each i has a conjunct
∃ Nxi( Nxi = Nci), where Nc is the tuple of all constants from Ci which occur in D+{	∈wi}.
Take any such c∈Ci which occurs in D+{	∈wi}. Since M witnesses D+{	∈wi},
I(c)∈Dom(f(wi)), and so (M;f(wi)) |=∃x(x= c). Therefore, (M;f(wi)) |=∃ Nx( Nx=
Nc) as desired.
• (2)⇒ (1): Suppose T |=VD ¬D+{	∈wi}. Then there is a varying domain (equality)
model M =(WM; RM ;Dom; I) of T with w∈WM such that (M;w) |=D+{	∈wi}. We
show that M witnesses D + {	∈wi}.
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De4ne f :WD→WM as in the proof of Lemma 3.5. Then
◦ (wi; wj)∈RD⇒ (f(wi); f(wj))∈RM ;
◦ 	∈wi⇒ (M;f(wi)) |=	
by the same reasoning as we gave there.
So all that remains is to show that I(c)∈Dom(f(wi)) for each constant symbol
c∈Ci which occurs in D + {	∈wi}. By the same reasoning which shows that
(M;f(wi)) |=	 for each 	∈wi, we see that
(M;f(wi)) |= ∃ Nxi( Nxi = Nci);
where Nci is the tuple of all constants from Ci occurring in D + {	∈wi} (because
∃ Nxi( Nxi = Nci), like each 	∈wi, is a conjunct of i). Therefore,
(M;f(wi)) |= ∃ x(x = c)
for each c∈Ci which occurs in D + {	∈wi}. Then there is some a∈Dom(f(wi))
such that (M;f(wi)) |=(ca = c), meaning I(ca)= I(c). Thus, I(c)= a∈Dom(f(wi))
as desired.
6.4. The varying domain construction
Using the Varying Domain Testing Lemma, we can now carry out the varying
domain construction.
Construction 6.10. Given a decidable varying domain theory T which has a varying
domain model, the construction will produce a varying domain Kripke model M .
Begin by 4xing an in4nite collection {Ci : i∈!} of in4nite sets of constants, which
are mutually disjoint and each disjoint from L. We will construct a sequence of varying
domain FKDs Dn. For that purpose, 4x enumerations 	
p
0 ; 	
p
1 ; 	
p
2 ; : : : of all sentences
in L∪C0 ∪ · · · ∪Cp, for each p∈!. We will construct the Dn by satisfying complete-
ness requirements for all existing worlds with respect to the enumeration 	p0 ; 	
p
1 ; 	
p
2 ; : : :
(once wp has been created). This will guarantee that we eventually decide every sen-
tence of L∪C0 ∪C1 ∪C2 : : : at every possible world. Moreover, since we intend to
put Ci as the domain of wi in the model M , we will choose Henkin witnesses for
existential sentences at wi from Ci.
Stage −1: D0 = ({w00 = ∅}; R0 = ∅).
Stage n: By induction we have a varying domain tree FKD Dn=(Wn={wn0 ; : : :; wnp };
Rn). Suppose  (n)= (i; e).
If i¿p, let Dn+1 =Dn and update indices from n to n+ 1.
If i6p, we shall satisfy the eth completeness requirement (with respect to the enu-
meration of sentences in L∪C0 ∪ · · · ∪Cp) at wi. Let D=D + {	pe ∈wni }. Using the
decidability of T , e#ectively check whether T |=VD ¬D.
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(1) If T |=VD ¬D, we associate ¬	pe with wi: let Dn+1 =Dn+{¬	pe ∈wni } and update
indices.
(2) If T |=VD ¬D, we shall associate 	pe with wi. We also satisfy a Henkin witness
or a -witness requirement for 	pe at wi if necessary:
• if 	pe =∃x (x), let Dn+1 =Dn + {	pe ;  (cj)∈wni } where cj is the least element
of Ci not occurring in D. (Since we intend to de4ne a varying domain model
with Ci as the domain of wi, we choose a Henkin witness cj from Ci.)
• if 	pe = , let Dn+1 = ({wn+10 ; : : : ; wn+1p ; wn+1p+1 }; Rn+1) where wn+1i =wni ∪{	pe };
wn+1p+1 = { }; wn+1j =wnj for j = i; p+ 1; and Rn+1 =Rn ∪{(wi; wp+1)}.
Otherwise just let Dn+1 =Dn + {	pe ∈wni } and update indices.
Now de4ne a varying domain model M =(W;R;D; I) from the Dn in the usual
manner. We let wi =
⋃∞
n=0 w
n
i , and then set
• W = {wi :wni occurs in some Dn}.
• (wi; wj)∈R⇔ (wni ; wnj )∈Rn for some n.
• For the domain function D, we set up the construction with the intention of putting
D(wi)=Ci. Because we included equality in the language for the purposes of this
construction, we must 4rst “mod out” by the equality relation de4ned by the contents
of the wi.
De4ne an equivalence relation ∼ on ⋃∞i=0 Ci as follows: c ∼ c′ i# (c= c′)∈wi
for some wi ∈W . Let [c] denote the equivalence class of c∈Ci with respect to ∼.
Then D(wi)= {[c] : c′ ∈ [c] for some c′ ∈Ci}. 6
• For each n-place relation symbol P, wi ∈W , and n-tuple (d1; d2; : : : ; dn) of ele-
ments of
⋃∞
i=0 D(wi), (d1; d2; : : : ; dn)∈ I(wi)(P) i# P(c1; : : : ; cn)∈wi for some (every)
c1 ∈d1, c2 ∈d2; : : : ; cn ∈dn.
That ∼ is an equivalence relation, and that the de4nition of I is well-de4ned, follows
from the fact that each FKD Dn has a witnessing equality model, as we will show in
the Consistency Lemma.
That M is in fact a varying domain model follows from the Closure Lemma below.
We will show that for each wi ∈W and each sentence 	 of L∪C0 ∪C1 ∪ : : :, either 	 or
¬	 is in wi. Hence, for each n-place relation symbol P and n-tuple Nc∈ (
⋃∞
i=0 Ci)
n, either
P( Nc)∈wi or ¬P( Nc)∈wi. Then I(wi)(P)⊆ (
⋃∞
i=0 D(wi))
n, as required for a varying
domain model.
Lemma 6.11 (Consistency Lemma). Each Dn is T -consistent.
Proof. By induction on n:
Base case: D0 is T -consistent since T has a varying domain model by hypothesis.
Induction step: Assume Dn =(Wn = {wn0 ; : : : ; wnp }; Rn) is T -consistent. To show that
Dn+1 is T -consistent, we look at how Dn is extended to Dn+1 at stage n. Recall that
D=Dn + {	pe ∈wni }.
6 Note that the D(wi) are not necessarily disjoint. We may have c∈Ci and c′ ∈Cj such that (c= c′) was
put in some (and hence every) w∈W . Then [c] = [c′]∈D(wi)∩D(wj).
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(1) In the case that T |=VD ¬D, no varying domain model of T witnesses D (according
to the Varying Domain Testing Lemma). But since Dn is T -consistent, some vary-
ing domain model M of T witnesses Dn via f. Then (M;f(wni )) |=	pe (otherwise
M witnesses D). So (M;f(wni )) |=¬	pe , meaning M also witnesses Dn+1 via f.
(2) In the case that T |=VD ¬D, there is a varying domain model M of T which wit-
nesses D via f. So in particular (M;f(wni )) |=	pe . We claim that M also witnesses
Dn+1. If 	
p
e is not an existential nor a diamond sentence, this is clear.
• if 	pe =∃x (x): since (M;f(wni )) |=	pe , there is some a∈Dom(f(wni )) such
that (M;f(wni )) |=  (ca). Then M witnesses Dn+1 via f if we set I(cj)= a.
(We interpret the chosen Henkin witness cj as an element a which witnesses
the existential sentence. Note that we can set I(cj)= a since cj does not occur
in D.)
• if 	pe = : since (M;f(wni )) |=	pe , there is a possible world w of M such that
(f(wni ; w))∈RM and (M;w) |=  . So M witnesses Dn+1 via f if we expand f
by setting f(wn+1p+1 )=w.
Lemma 6.12 (Closure Lemma). For each wi ∈W ,
(1) For each sentence 	 of L∪C0 ∪C1 ∪C2 : : :, exactly one of 	 or ¬	 is in wi
(2) (	∧  )∈wi⇔	∈wi and  ∈wi;
(3) ∃x (x)∈wi⇔ there is a c∈Ci such that  (c)∈wi;
(4)  ∈wi⇔ there is a wj ∈W such that (wi; wj)∈R and  ∈wj;
(5) T ⊆wi.
Proof.
(1) Take any sentence 	 of L∪C0 ∪C1 ∪C2 : : : : Find n such that 	 is a sentence
of L∪C0 ∪C1 ∪C2· · · ∪Cn, wni exists in Dn,  (n)= (i; e), and 	=	ie. By the
construction, either 	ie ∈wn+1i or ¬	ie ∈wn+1i .
As usual, it cannot be that both 	∈wi and ¬	∈wi, because that would con-
tradict the consistency of some Dn.
(2) As in Lemma 3.8.
(3) (⇒) Suppose ∃x (x)∈wi. Then ∃x (x) is added to wni for some n. Then recall
that  (c) is also added to wni in the construction for some c∈Ci (to ful4ll the
Henkin witness requirement).
(⇐) Suppose  (c)∈wi for some c∈Ci but ∃x (x) =∈wi. Then there is some
n such that ¬∃x (x)∈wni and  (c)∈wni . This clearly contradicts the consistency
of Dn.
(4) As in Lemma 3.8.
(5) As in Lemma 3.8.
Lemma 6.13 (Truth Lemma). For each wi ∈W and each sentence 	 of L∪C0 ∪C1 ∪
C2 ∪ · · ·
(M;wi) |= [	] ⇔ 	 ∈ wi;
where [	] denotes the result of replacing in 	 each c∈Ci by [c]∈D(wi).
S. Ganguli, A. Nerode / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 128 (2004) 141–195 187
Proof. The same as for previous Truth Lemmas, by induction on the structure of 	.
The key clause of the induction is for the existential quanti4er, which follows from
clause (3) of the Closure Lemma and from the de4nition of D(wi).
Once again, the construction and the Truth Lemma together show that truth in the
model M is decidable. Thus, we have produced a decidable varying domain model
of a given decidable varying domain theory T , establishing an e#ective completeness
theorem for 4rst-order modal logic over varying domain Kripke models.
Theorem 6.14. Every decidable varying domain theory T has a decidable varying
domain Kripke model.
6.5. Monotonic domains
We now turn to the monotonic domain case. We will again work over a mutually
disjoint in4nite collection of new constants Ci, i∈!. In the varying domain construc-
tion, we made Ci the domain of wi in the varying domain model. For the monotonic
domain construction, the domain of wi will include Ci. But to produce a monotonic
domain model, it will also need to contain the domain of wj if (wj; wi)∈R; similarly,
the domain of wj will include Cj, but will also contain the domain of wk if (wk; wj)∈R;
and so on. So the domains of the worlds in the model will be de4ned in terms of the
Ci in such a way as to make them monotonically increasing in R. With this in mind,
we give the following de4nition.
Denition 6.15. A monotonic FKD is a FKD D=(W;R), with the added structure
that D(wi) is a set of constant symbols for each wi ∈W such that (wi; wj)∈R implies
D(wi)⊆D(wj), and each 	∈wi is a sentence of L∪D(wi).
If we think of a monotonic FKD as a 4nite approximation to a monotonic domain
Kripke model, the set D(wi) serves as the stand-in for the domain of the possible world
wi. This explains why we require a sentence 	∈wi to be in the language L∪D(wi).
As usual, we want to make sure the FKDs we construct have witnessing models.
Like the varying domain case, a witnessing model should, in addition to preserving
the truth of the sentences and the accessibility relation of the FKD, have elements
corresponding to the constants occurring in the FKD which belong to the right domains
of the witnessing model. This is where we will make use of the languages L(w), which
have constants for every element in the domain of a possible world w.
Denition 6.16. A monotonic domain Kripke model M =(WM; RM ;Dom; I) witnesses
a monotonic FKD D=(WD; RD) via f; g if
• f :WD→WM is a function such that
(wi; wj) ∈ RD ⇒ (f(wi); f(wj)) ∈ RM :
• g maps each constant symbol c∈D(wi) to a constant g(c)∈L(f(wi));
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• if 	∈wi, then (M;f(wi)) |=	(g( Nc)= Nc), where Nc is the tuple of all constant symbols
from D(wi) occurring in 	
As usual, we say a monotonic FKD D is (T -)consistent if there exists a monotonic
domain Kripke model (of T ) which witnesses D.
The function g guarantees that for each constant in D(wi) there is an element in
the right domain in the witnessing model. If a constant c∈D(wi) occurs in a sentence
	∈wi, there should be an element in the domain of f(wi) corresponding to c. Such
an element is named by a constant in L(f(wi)), and is speci4ed as g(c). Then each
sentence 	∈wi must be true at f(wi) in the witnessing model M , but with the constants
from D(wi) replaced by their counterparts from L(f(wi)).
The function g was unnecessary in the previous de4nitions of a witnessing model, for
constant domains and varying domains (De4nitions 3.2 and 6.6, respectively), because
in those cases it suOced to require that a witnessing model be a model of a language
containing all the constants occurring in the FKD (L∪C and L∪C0 ∪ · · · ∪Cn, respec-
tively). The constants occurring in the FKD were simply interpreted as elements of the
witnessing model. Clearly, we could recast those de4nitions in the manner of the one
above, with each constant c in a constant domain or varying domain FKD corresponding
to a constant g(c) in LM in a witnessing constant domain or varying domain model M .
6.6. The representing formula
We want a representing formula which will allow us to test whether a given mono-
tonic FKD is consistent. This representing formula must encode that the constants of
D(wi) correspond to elements in the domain of f(wi). As in the varying domain case,
we will do this by existentially quantifying out the constants of the D(wi) within a
nested diamond formula. The witnesses for these quanti4ers will allow us to de4ne the
function g on the constants of the FKD in the proof of the new monotonic Testing
Lemma.
We need to take care to existentially quantify out the constants of D(wi) at the right
level in the nested diamond structure of the representing formula, so that the existential
quanti4ers speak about the existence of elements in the right place. We will see this
at work in the corresponding Testing Lemma.
Denition 6.17. Suppose D=(WD = {w0; : : : ; wn}; RD) is a monotonic tree FKD with
root node w0. Since D is a tree FKD, each wi ∈WD has a unique RD-predecessor; call
it w′i . Note that by monotonicity, D(w
′
i)⊆D(wi). Let Bi denote the set D(wi)−D(w′i).
Now we will de4ne a formula i for each wi ∈W . We will quantify out the constants
from Bi at the level in the nested diamond structure corresponding to wi. 7 In both
clauses below, Nbi =(b0; : : : ; bm) denotes the tuple of all constants from Bi occurring in
7 Note that we do not want to quantify out all the constants from D(wi) at that level, because D(wi)
includes some constants—namely the constants from D(w′i )—that should be quanti4ed out “higher” levels.
That is our reason for de4ning the Bi .
S. Ganguli, A. Nerode / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 128 (2004) 141–195 189
D; Nxi =(x0; : : : ; xm) is a corresponding tuple of fresh variables; and Nxi = Nbi denotes the
conjunction x0 = b0 ∧ · · · ∧ xm = bm.
• If wi is a leaf, then i =∃ Nxi((
∧{	 |	∈wi})(Nxi= Nbi)).
• If wi is a not a leaf, then
i = ∃ Nxi
((∧
({	 |	 ∈ wi} ∪ {j | (wi; wj) ∈ R})
)
( Nxi= Nbi)
)
:
Finally, let D =0, the formula associated with the root node. We call D the
representing formula of D.
Lemma 6.18 (Monotonic domain testing lemma). For a monotonic FKD D=(WD;
RD), a theory T , and a sentence 	, the following are equivalent:
(1) D + {	∈wi} is T -consistent, i.e., there exists a monotonic domain model of T
witnessing D + {	∈wi}.
(2) T |=MD ¬D+{	∈wi}.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proofs of the earlier Testing Lemmas. For brevity,
we let 0i denote the conjunction
∧
({	 |	∈wi} ∪ {j | (wi; wj) ∈ RD})
for each wi ∈WD in a given monotonic FKD.
• (1)⇒ (2): Suppose M is a monotonic domain model of T which witnesses D′=D+
{	∈wi} via f; g. Let Nc be the constants from the D(wi) which occur in D′. We will
prove by induction that for each wi ∈WD, (M;f(wi)) |=i(g( Nc)= Nc). Then, because 0
is free of such constants, we will have showed that (M;f(w0)) |=D+{	∈wi}.
For the base case, suppose wi is a leaf. Since M witnesses D via f; g, (M;f(wi)) |=
	(g( Nc)= Nc) for each 	∈wi. Hence,
(M;f(wi)) |=
(∧
{	 |	 ∈ wi}
)
(g( Nc)= Nc):
Let Nbi be the elements in Nc which belong to Bi. Since Bi⊆D(wi), g( Nbi)⊆L(f(wi)).
Therefore,
(M;f(wi)) |= ∃ Nx
((∧
{	 |	 ∈ wi}
)
(g( Nc)= Nc) ( Nx=g( Nbi))
)
which implies
(M;f(wi)) |= ∃ Nx
((∧
{	 |	 ∈ wi}
)
( Nx= Nbi)
)
(g( Nc)= Nc)
i.e., (M;f(wi)) |=i(g( Nc)= Nc) as desired.
For the inductive step, suppose wi is not a leaf. Consider each wj ∈WD such
that (wi; wj)∈RD. By hypothesis, (f(wi); f(wj))∈RM . By induction, (M;f(wj)) |=
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j(g( Nc)= Nc). Moreover, as above, (M;f(wi)) |=	(g( Nc)= Nc) for each 	∈wi. Hence,
(M;f(wi)) |=0i(g( Nc)= Nc): Again let Nbi be the elements in Nc which belong to Bi.
Then, as above,
(M;f(wi)) |= ∃ Nx(0i(g( Nc)= Nc)( Nx=g( Nbi)))
which implies
(M;f(wi)) |= ∃ Nx(0i( Nx= Nbi)) (g( Nc)= Nc)
i.e., (M;f(wi)) |=i(g( Nc)= Nc).
• (2)⇒ (1): Supposing T |=MD ¬D+{	∈wi}, there is a monotonic domain model M =
(WM; RM ;Dom; I) of T with w∈WM such that (M;w) |=D+{	∈wi}. We will show
that M witnesses D′=D+{	∈wi}. The proof is similar to the earlier proofs of the
Testing Lemmas, in that we will de4ne f by induction, using the nested diamond
structure of D+{	∈wi}. Here we must also de4ne g as we go; we will use the
witnesses for the existential quanti4ers in D+{	∈wi} to do so.
For the base case of the root w0, f(w0)=w. Recall that D+{	∈wi} is of the form
∃ Nx(00( Nx= Nb0));
where Nb0 is all constants from B0(=D(w0)) occurring in D′. Therefore, since (M;
f(w0)) |=D+{	∈wi}, there exists Nc0 ∈L(f(w0)) such that
(M;f(w0)) |= (00( Nx= Nb0))( Nc0= Nx)
i.e., (M;f(w0)) |=00( Nc0= Nb0). Set g( Nb0)= Nc0. Note that 00 is a conjunction that in-
cludes among its conjuncts each 	∈w0. Hence, (M;f(w0)) |=	(g( Nb0)= Nb0) for each
	∈w0, where Nb0 includes all the constant symbols from D(w0) occurring in 	.
For the induction step, suppose wi ∈WD is a node other than the root. Let w0→wi1
→· · ·→wim→wi be the unique path through the tree D=(WD; RD) from the root w0
to wi. By induction we have de4ned f(w0); f(wi1); : : : ; f(wim) and g( Nb0)∈L(f(w0)),
g( Nbi1)∈L(f(wi1)); : : : ; g( Nbim)∈L(f(wim)) such that
(M;f(wim)) |= 0im(g( Nb0)= Nb0)(g( Nbi1)= Nbi1) : : : (g( Nbim)= Nbim);
where Nb0; Nbi1; : : : ; Nbim are, respectively, the constants from B0; Bi1; : : : ; Bim occurring
in D′.
Since (wim; wi)∈RD, i is among the conjuncts of 0im. Hence,
(M;f(wim)) |=i(g( Nb0)= Nb0)(g( Nbi1)= Nbi1) : : : (g( Nbim)= Nbim):
Therefore, there exists w∈WM such that (f(wim); w)∈RM and
(M;w) |= i(g( Nb0)= Nb0)(g( Nbi1)= Nbi1) : : : (g( Nbim)= Nbim):
Fix such a w and set f(wi)=w. Now we will de4ne g on Nbi, the constants from
Bi occurring in D′. Recall that i is of the form ∃ Nx(0i( Nx= Nbi)). Hence, there exist
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constants Nci ∈L(f(wi)) such that
(M;f(wi)) |= 0i(g( Nb0)= Nb0)(g( Nbi1)= Nbi1) : : : (g( Nbim)= Nbim)( Nx= Nbi)( Nci= Nx)
i.e.,
(M;f(wi)) |= 0i(g( Nb0)= Nb0)(g( Nbi1)= Nbi1) : : : (g( Nbim)= Nbim)( Nci= Nbi):
Set g( Nbi)= Nci to establish the desired inductive hypothesis.
Then, since each 	∈wi is among the conjuncts of 0i,
(M;f(wi)) |= 	(g( Nb0)= Nb0)(g( Nbi1)= Nbi1) : : : (g( Nbim)= Nbim)(g( Nbi)= Nbi):
Notice that since 	∈wi is a sentence of L(D(wi)) and D(wi)=B0 ∪Bi1 ∪ · · ·Bim,
Nb0; Nbi1; : : : Nbim; Nbi includes all the constants which appear in such 	∈wi. Hence, for
each 	∈wi,
(M;f(wi)) |= 	(g( Nc)= Nc);
where Nc is the tuple of all constants appearing in 	, as required to show that M
witnesses D via f; g.
Using this Testing Lemma, we can carry out the construction of a decidable mono-
tonic domain Kripke model.
6.7. The monotonic domain construction
Construction 6.19. Given a decidable monotonic domain theory T , the construction
will produce a monotonic domain model M . We will construct a sequence of mono-
tonic FKDs Dn. When we create an existing world wni in a FKD Dn, we will specify a
set of constants D(wi). We will set Dn(wni )=D(wi) for each FKD Dn, and use D(wi)
as the domain of wi in the model. Hence, we will satisfy completeness requirements
at wi with respect to the language L∪D(wi), and choose Henkin witnesses for exis-
tential sentences at wi from D(wi). The D(wi) will be de4ned in terms of the sets of
constants Ci.
Stage −1: D0 = ({w00 = ∅}; R0 = ∅): Set D(w0)=C0, and 4x an enumeration 	00 ; 	01 ;
	02; : : : of all sentences in L∪D(w0).
Stage n: By induction we have a monotonic domain FKD Dn =(Wn = {wn0 ; : : : ; wnp };
Rn). We have also de4ned D(wj) and 4xed an enumeration 	
j
0 ; 	
j
1 ; 	
j
2 ; : : : of all sen-
tences in L∪D(wj), for each j=0; : : : ; p. As we noted above, Dn(wnj )=D(wj), so (by
the de4nition of a monotonic FKD) (wni ; w
n
j )∈Rn implies D(wi)⊆D(wj), and each
	∈wnj is a sentence of L∪D(wj).
Suppose  (n)= (i; e). If i¿p, let Dn+1 =Dn and update indices.
If i6p, we satisfy the eth completeness requirement (with respect to L∪D(wi))
at wi. Let D=Dn + {	ie ∈wni }. Note that 	ie is a sentence of L∪D(wi). Using the
decidability of T , e#ectively check whether T |=MD ¬D.
(1) If so, associate ¬	ie with wi: let Dn+1 =Dn + {¬	ie ∈wni } and update indices.
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(2) If not, we associate 	ie with wi. We also satisfy a Henkin witness or a -witness
requirement for 	ie at wi if necessary:
• if 	ie =∃x (x), let Dn+1 =Dn + {	ie;  (cj)∈wni } where cj is the least element
of D(wi) not occurring in Dn; and update indices. (Since we intend to de4ne a
monotonic domain model with D(wi) as the domain of wi, we choose a Henkin
witness from D(wi).)
• if 	ie = , let Dn+1 = ({wn+10 ; : : : ; wn+1p ; wn+1p+1 }; Rn+1) where wn+1i =wni ∪{	ie};
wn+1p+1 = { }; wn+1j =wnj for j = i; p+ 1; and Rn+1 =Rn ∪{(wi; wp+1)}. Also, set
D(wp+1)=D(wi)∪Cp+1, and 4x an enumeration 	p+10 ; 	p+11 ; 	p+12 ; : : : of all sen-
tences in L∪D(wp+1). (Note that our de4nition of D(wp+1) clearly satis4es
the monotonicity requirement. In fact, for each wi, D(wi)=Ci0 ∪Ci1 ∪ · · · ∪Cim ,
where i0 = 0, im = i, and w0→wi1 →wi2 →· · ·→wim is the unique path through
(Wn; Rn) from the root w0 to wi.)
Otherwise simply let Dn+1 = ({wn+10 ; : : : ; wn+1p }; Rn+1) with wn+1i =wni ∪{	ie};
wn+1j =w
n
j for j = i; and Rn+1 =Rn.
Now de4ne a monotonic domain model M =(W;R;D; I): let wi =
⋃∞
n=1 w
n
i ,
and
• W = {wi :wni occurs in some Dn};
• (wi; wj)∈R⇔ (wni ; wnj )∈Rn for some n;
• D(wi) as de4ned over the course of the construction;
• for each n-place relation symbol P, wi ∈W , and n-tuple Nc of elements of D(wi)
Nc ∈ I(wi)(P) ⇔ P( Nc) ∈ wi:
Note that M is a monotonic domain model since the D(wi) were de4ned in such a
way as to be monontonically increasing in R. Also, I(wi)(P)⊆D(wi)n for each wi ∈W
and n-place relation symbol P, since we decide the sentences of L∪D(wi) at wi over
the course of the construction.
The Dn are constructed based on criteria which maintain T -consistency (with respect
to monotonic domain models).
Lemma 6.20 (Consistency Lemma). Each FKD Dn is T -consistent.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proofs of the prior Consistency Lemmas. By induc-
tion on n:
Base case: D0 is T -consistent since T has a monotonic domain model by hypothesis.
Induction step: Assume Dn is T -consistent. To show that Dn+1 is T -consistent, look
at how Dn is extended to Dn+1 at stage n. Recall that D=Dn + {	ie ∈wni }. Let Nc be
the tuple of all constant symbols in D(wi) occurring in 	ie.
(1) In the case that T |=¬D, no monotonic domain model of T witnesses D (by the
Testing Lemma). But since Dn is T -consistent, some monotonic domain model M
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of T witnesses Dn via f; g. Then (M;f(wni )) |=	ie(g(c)= Nc) (otherwise M witnesses
D). So it must be that (M;f(wni )) |=¬	ie(g(c)= Nc), so M also witnesses Dn+1.
(2) In the case that T |=¬D, there is a monotonic domain model M of T which
witnesses D. So in particular (M;f(wni )) |=	ie(g(c)= Nc). We claim that M also
witnesses Dn+1. If 	ie is not an existential nor a diamond sentence, this is clear.
• if 	ie =∃x (x): since (M;f(wni )) |=	ie(g(c)= Nc), there is some d∈L(f(wni )) such
that (M;f(wni )) |=  (d)(g(c)= Nc). Then M witnesses Dn+1 via f; g if we set
g(cj)=d (i.e., we take the chosen Henkin witness cj and map it via g to an
element (named by d) in the model M which witnesses the existential sentence).
• if 	ie = : since (M;f(wni )) |=	ie(g(c)= Nc), there is a possible world w of M
such that (f(wni ; w))∈RM and (M;w) |=  (g(c)= Nc). So M witnesses Dn+1 via
f; g if we expand f by setting f(wn+1p+1 )=w.
Lemma 6.21 (Closure Lemma). For each wi ∈W ,
(1) For each sentence 	 of L∪D(wi), exactly one of 	 or ¬	 is in wi.
(2) (	∧  )∈wi⇔	∈wi and  ∈wi.
(3) ∃x (x)∈wi⇔ there is a c∈D(wi) such that  (d)∈wi.
(4)  ∈wi⇔ there is a wj ∈W such that (wi; wj)∈R and  ∈wj.
(5) T ⊆wi.
Proof.
(1) Find a stage n such that wni exists in Dn,  (n)= (i; e), and 	=	
i
e. By the con-
struction, either 	ie ∈wn+1i or ¬	ie ∈wn+1i .
If both 	∈wi and ¬	∈wi, then they are both in some wni . Let Nc be the tuple
of all elements in D(wi) occurring in 	. Clearly there is no model M with a
world f(wni ) and constants g( Nc) in L(f(w
n
i )) such that (M;f(w
n
i )) |=	(g(c)= Nc)
and (M;f(wni )) |=¬	(g(c)= Nc). Thus, the consistency of Dn is contradicted.
(2) Same as for previous Closure Lemmas.
(3) (⇒) Suppose ∃x (x)∈wi. Then ∃x (x) is added to wni at some stage n. Then
 (c) is also added to wni at stage n for some c∈D(wi) (to ful4ll the Henkin
witness requirement).
(⇐) Suppose  (c)∈wi for some d∈D(wi) but ∃x (x) =∈wi. Then there is
some n such that ¬∃x (x)∈wni and  (c)∈wni . Let Nc be the tuple of all ele-
ments in D(wi) occurring in 	. Clearly there is no model M with a world f(wni )
and constants g( Nc), g(d)∈L(f(wni )) such that (M;f(wni )) |=¬∃x (x)(g(c)= Nc) and
(M;f(wni )) |=  (d)(g(c)= Nc). Thus, the consistency of Dn is contradicted.
(4) Same as for previous Closure Lemmas.
(5) Same as for previous Closure Lemmas.
Lemma 6.22 (Truth Lemma). For each wi ∈W and each sentence 	 of L∪D(wi)
(M;wi) |= 	 ⇔ 	 ∈ wi:
Proof. By induction on the structure of 	, as for previous Truth Lemmas.
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As before, the Truth Lemma and the Construction together establish that truth in
the model M is decidable. It is clear that D(wi) is a computable set for each wi ∈W :
as we noted in the Construction, D(wi)=Ci0 ∪Ci1 ∪ · · · ∪Cim , where i0 = 0, im = i, and
w0→wi1 →wi2 →· · ·→wim is the unique path through (W;R) from the root w0 to wi.
We can e#ectively 4nd Ci0 ; Ci1 ; : : : ; Cim by looking at any Dn in which w
n
i exists. Since
Ci0 ; Ci1 ; : : : ; Cim are computable sets by assumption, D(wi) is also computable.
Thus, we have produced a decidable monotonic domain model of a given decidable
monotonic domain theory T , as desired.
Theorem 6.23. Every decidable monotonic domain theory T has a decidable mono-
tonic domain Kripke model.
6.8. Conclusion
In the preceding sections we have proved e#ective completeness theorems for varying
domain and monotonic domain 4rst-order modal logic, in a similar manner as for
constant domain K in Section 3, and for constant domain T, K4, K5, S4, and S5
in Section 5. We stated and proved a Testing Lemma which applies to 4nite Kripke
diagrams, and then used the Testing Lemma to construct a decidable Kripke model for
a decidable theory via such FKDs.
To be precise, we have proved e#ective completeness theorems for the varying
domain and monotonic domain versions of K, since no conditions were placed on the
possibility relations of the Kripke models. Moreover, we stated the Varying Domain
and Monotonic Domain Testing Lemmas (Lemmas 6.9 and 6.18, respectively) with
only semantic clauses. This suOces to carry out the constructions (as in Section 3).
We have not supplyied the corresponding syntactic clauses, as we did in the Testing
Lemmas for the constant domain logics in Sections 2 and 3 (Lemmas 4.4 and 5.6).
We brieAy indicate how to 4ll in these gaps.
With regard to the Testing Lemmas, we simply note that that the Varying Domain
and Monotonic Domain Testing Lemmas can be extended to include similar syntactic
clauses. By using the appropriate tableau proof theory for the varying domain and
monotonic domain logics. We refer the reader to [4] for the de4nitions of the varying
domain tableau, and to [10] for the monotonic domain case. Because we use equality
in the de4nition of the representing formula in the varying domain case, we include
the tableau rules for equality; refer to [4] for these also.
Given the de4nitions of tableau proofs corresponding to each type of domain as-
sumption, we can de4ne the notion of a tableau deduction from a varying domain
or monotonic domain FKD, following De4nition 4.3. Then we can extend the Vary-
ing Domain and Monotonic Domain Testing Lemmas with syntactic clauses, similar
to the syntactic clauses of Lemmas 4.4 and 5.6, but referring to varying domain and
monotonic domain tableau.
We have chosen to omit the technical details, but we wish to emphasize that the
syntactic viewpoint of tableau deductions is very useful for understanding the Testing
Lemma and its role in our e#ective constructions of Kripke models. In particular,
we can test a FKD D + {	∈wi} for T -consistency by checking whether there is a
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tableau deduction of wi |=¬	 from D and T . If there is no such tableau deduction,
then the complete systematic tableau (CST) has a noncontradictory path which yields
a witnessing model for D + {	∈wi}. The key point is that using the appropriate
set of tableau rules for the given logic to generate the CST implies that the model
de4ned from the noncontradictory path is a Kripke model for that particular logic. Using
monotonic domain tableau, as in the Monotonic Domain Testing Lemma, produces a
monotonic domain Kripke model; similarly for varying domains. Note that we applied
this idea in 5, with respect to the logics T, K4, K5, S4, and S5: using the L-rules to
generate the CST produced to an L-model.
In fact, it should be clear that by combining the techniques used in Section 5 (for
the logics T, K4, K5, S4, and S5) with the tools developed in this Section (for varying
domains and monotonic domains), we can prove e#ective completeness theorems for
the varying domain and monotonic domain versions of T, K4, K5, S4, and S5 as well.
Namely, we can prove Varying Domain and Monotonic Domain Testing Lemmas for
each of these logics, using the Kripke models and tableau proofs corresponding to
each. Then that Testing Lemma can be used to carry out a construction of a decidable
varying domain or monotonic domain L-model (of a given decidable varying domain
or monotonic domain L-theory). The technical details are straightforward, so we omit
them.
In conclusion, we have established Testing Lemmas and e#ective completeness the-
orems for 18 di#erent 4rst-order modal logics: each combination of constant domain,
varying domain, or monotonic domain; and K, T, K4, K5, S4, or S5.
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